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Abstract 
Although scholarly commentary of the last decade has engaged more 
intensively than ever with the content of George Eliot’s ideas concerning 
nineteenth-century British culture, the devices and techniques Eliot employs 
in the transmission of those ideas remain less explored. Consequently, room 
exists for a study as attentive to the formal characteristics of Eliot’s messages 
as recent scholars have been to the content of those messages. This 
dissertation seeks to elucidate the ways in which specific formal techniques 
that characterize Eliot’s fictional work evince her engagement with the 
thinking of social theorists, particularly Ludwig Feuerbach. The project 
contends that Eliot internalizes Feuerbach’s view that “man is God to man,” 
injects that view into the formal techniques of her fiction, and then wields 
those techniques in an effort to elicit a sympathetic response from her 
audience, thereby initiating societal change. Unlike other critical 
commentary that treats the breadth of Eliot’s views, this project restricts its 
focus to analyzing the ways in which the formal innovations Eliot deploys 
shape their author’s complex and sometimes contradictory social vision. In 
the process of examining Eliot’s efforts to change her audience, our 
understanding of her social project changes as well, as the provincial 
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In 1868, when George Eliot published The Spanish Gypsy, A Poem, 
she forewarned her readers to expect a change. The moment they opened 
the book, they encountered new subtitles that attached occupational 
descriptors to titles of her prior novels—Silas Marner, the Weaver of 
Raveloe, for example, or Felix Holt, the Radical. This time, Eliot boldly 
announced, form stands front and center. 
Close attention to George Eliot’s language suggests that, whether 
critics have recognized it or not, her brandishing of a distinctive range of 
formal techniques contributes to an understanding of nineteenth-century 
England as a nation struggling to reconcile concepts of individualism and 
community.1 Eliot maintains a strong interest in the relationship between
                                                
1 For a cogent examination of the nineteenth-century forces operative upon Eliot, see 
George Eliot in Context (2013), edited by Eliot scholar Margaret Harris. The volume 
identifies a range of “relevancies” that form the various contexts pertinent to 
understanding and appreciating George Eliot as an acute observer of the massive social 
changes of her time. The work reveals Eliot, defiant of many Victorian orthodoxies, to be 
at once chronicler and analyst, novelist of nostalgia, and formidable thinker about the 
social issues that dominated Victorian England. The volume contains analyses of Eliot’s 
critical history and of the conditions of production and distribution of her novels and 
journalism. However, Harris’s work stops short of connecting its authoritative 
discussion of George Eliot’s intellectual and social context to the narrative strategies of 




her fictional communities and a tradition of social thought in which 
community becomes an abstraction, a qualitative ideal rather than a 
perceived reality—but an ideal that addresses an actual world, 
immediately present, dominated by individualist values and lobbying to 
recover communal ones. 
This dissertation presents a case that George Eliot’s formal 
elements of descriptive language—her techniques of diction and modes 
of direct and indirect address—express in previously unexamined ways 
certain ideas that Eliot inherited from Strauss, Comte, Spinoza, and 
Feuerbach. Eliot exploits these techniques in order to explore the limits 
and potential of sympathetic ideals as well as to reflect upon the role that 
realist fiction plays in the production of social vision. The project finds 
these formal techniques concentrated most emphatically in her fictional 
works, particularly her novels, wherein Eliot attempts to engender within 
her readership an appreciation of and desire for the advancement of the 
community of humankind. By marshaling an arsenal of narrative 
strategies and formal innovations, Eliot seeks to awaken her audience’s 
sensibilities and initiate a slow but steady transformation of nineteenth-




Because George Eliot engaged in a Victorian tradition of social 
thought preoccupied with the regeneration of community, this study first 
sets her fiction within the context of a group of social theorists who 
discuss the major issues raised in contemporary debates about 
community and the individual: the place of traditional belief and custom; 
the relation of individualistic to societal values; and the difficulty of 
creating new forms to counteract the fragmented, self-serving, and 
isolating tendencies of increasingly heterogeneous and complex societies. 
The most distinctive and representative qualities of this tradition of social 
thought derive precisely from its commitment to social regeneration 
through a reshaping of thought and feeling. 
But this particular goal of reshaping suggests, in turn, how 
inadequate to the task social theory by itself was likely to be and how 
absolutely central to that task works of imaginative literature might 
become. George Eliot’s fiction attained this kind of centrality.2 This 
project explores the nature of that achievement by viewing Eliot’s formal 
                                                
2 In Modernizing George Eliot: The Writer as Artist, Intellectual, Proto-Modernist, Cultural 
Critic (2011), K.M. Newton examines Eliot's credentials as a radical thinker and social 
novelist and argues against relegating her to a literary tradition designated as 
“Victorian.” Opening with Eliot's relationship to the Romantic movement, Newton 
makes a vigorous case for Eliot as a strident critic of Victorian values who anticipates 
modernism in her narrative sophistication and who resembles Derrida more than 
Dickens in understanding the undecidable nature of ethical questions. As formal 
evidence, Newton points out that although Eliot's narrators radiate an air of 





techniques in light of nineteenth-century social theories and by analyzing 
how she endeavored by using those techniques to influence the attitudes 
of her contemporary readers. 
Chapter 1 of the dissertation looks closely at the philosophical and  
political concerns—those of Comte, Strauss, Spinoza, and, especially, 
Ludwig Feuerbach—that preoccupy Eliot in the earliest, most formative 
stages of her career. The chapter concentrates on the manner in which 
these interests congeal into a discourse of philosophical liberalism that 
triggers Eliot’s strategic coupling of social commitments and imaginative 
writing. 
Chapter 2 focuses tightly on the ways in which Eliot deploys the 
languages of hierarchy and deliverance in order to fictionally inscribe 
Feuerbach’s I-Thou concept, a concept that flows from his most 
conspicuous assertion in The Essence of Christianity that “man is God to 
man.”3 The chapter demonstrates how in her fiction Eliot imaginatively 
recasts this I-Thou formulation in order to instantiate and promote the 
central concern of humankind-as-community. 
                                                
3 Known principally for his captivating mid-nineteenth century criticism of Christianity, 
Feuerbach has been regarded by many critics as relevant only because he prefigured the 
views of Nietzsche, Marx, and Freud. Van A. Harvey’s Feuerbach and the Interpretation of 
Religion (Cambridge Studies in Religion and Critical Thought) (1997) characterizes this 
interpretation of Feuerbach’s significance as limited and inadequate, especially vis-à-vis 
his view of religion. By exploring the largely ignored works of Feuerbach, Harvey finds 
their ongoing pertinence. Harvey argues that Feuerbach’s philosophical development 
led him to a more complex and interesting theory of religion that has been 




Chapter 3 proceeds to examine the function played by Eliot’s 
techniques of direct and indirect address in shaping passages marked by 
an extraordinarily subtle movement between fictional character, narrator, 
and reader. These passages create an interaction especially appropriate to 
a novelistic approach in which Eliot demands that readers become 
empathizers—intimately involved and identifying with her fictional 
characters and therefore feeling and experiencing from a number of 
different centers of consciousness. 
By identifying the most distinct forms of Eliot’s formal techniques, 
the project builds on a theory that studying the manner and ability with 
which Eliot uses these methods can reveal how fictional identities become 
constructed, how power translates into relationships, and how a 
charitable aesthetic and humanitarian goals take shape through fictional 
words. 
This study does not treat George Eliot as a systematic social 
theorist but instead suggests that she grappled with the problem of social 
renewal in different yet analogous ways.4 Thus the project sets out not to 
                                                
4 In George Eliot and the Politics of National Inheritance (1994), Bernard Semmel offers a 
forceful counter argument. Semmel maintains that Eliot expresses her social views only 
tentatively and obliquely and does so almost inadvertently through the secondary 
concept of inheritance. For Semmel, Eliot views herself as intellectually “disinherited,” 
writing as she does at a time when much of England is being transformed from a 
traditional community to an alienating modern society. Semmel explores the 
relationship between Eliot’s variations on the theme of inheritance and what he regards 





track “influences” but rather to show how certain nineteenth-century 
ideas about humanity informed George Eliot’s sense of purpose as 
novelist and helped to shape both the form and the content of her fiction. 
Many of the formal devices and structural patterns characteristic of 
Eliot’s imaginative writing echo the innovative methods and ideas of the 
theorists she studied. Just as their new ideas provoke her to refine and 
recapitulate those ideas in the form of her work, George Eliot in turn 
challenges her readers to confront the necessity and difficulties of a 
gradual social transformation of nineteenth-century Britain, a 
transformation that Eliot seeks to initiate with a revolution in the 







“The train of causes”: 
Historical Circumstances and Context 
 
George Eliot’s social vision has a history. In late 1856, Mary Ann 
Evans began fashioning novels under her now-famous pseudonym. 
Before “George Eliot” came into existence, the thirty-year-old woman 
served as the clandestine editor of the Westminster Review, London’s 
leading intellectual journal founded by the utilitarian thinker Jeremy 
Bentham. The Review sought to publish thought provoking and reformist 
ideas and to function as an agent of change in the political, social, and 
moral spheres. By virtue of her affiliation with the journal and immersion 
in the cultural world of its London publisher, John Chapman, Evans 
interacted with many notable intellectuals of nineteenth-century Britain, 
including J.S. Mill, Thomas Huxley, Herbert Spencer, Harriet Martineau, 
and George Henry Lewes, later to become her companion. 
Thirty-eight years old when publishing her debut short story, “The 




writing late. By this time, she had spent much of her post-adolescent life 
studying, translating, and writing about the significant intellectual works 
of the time; she composed many Westminster Review pieces, including 
book reviews, commentary on political and social issues, and articles on 
contemporary European writing, especially writing from Germany. These 
experiences exposed her to the most current liberal thinking on religion, 
philosophy, politics, history, science and the arts, and immersed her in 
“most of the new ideas that have shaped the modern world” (GEL, I, 
xliv). Evans also established herself as an astute critic on assorted literary 
topics such as Antigone and a cultural observer on subjects as wide-
ranging as religious history and the future of German philosophy.  
In her early adulthood she translated David Friedrich Strauss’s The 
Life of Jesus in 1846, Ludwig Andreas von Feuerbach’s The Essence of 
Christianity in 1854, and Benedict de Spinoza’s Ethics in 1856, works that 
not only sounded the death knell for her own belief in a Christian God 
but also marked the great shift from religious to secular ethics in the 
nineteenth century. Feuerbach engaged in a humanistic version of 
Christianity that substituted man for the Divine. Eliot found value in this 
idea, viewing God not as a creator but as a creation of human beings, 
constructed by humans to fulfill concrete human needs. Eliot felt that 




which she regarded as a unifying force of humanity. Following 
Feuerbach’s example, then, Eliot turned away from the concept of a 
spiritual being named “God” and adopted the belief that every individual 
possesses the capacity and has an obligation to give a God-like love to 
other human beings. 
Feuerbach, and the German movement generally, regarded biblical 
writings as ancient evidence of humanity’s effort to reconcile life, 
mortality, pain, and the status of human beings in the natural realm. 
Affected by Feuerbach, Eliot thought of religion as an anthropological 
record of the origin and evolution of human morals. The implications of 
biblical criticism on the one hand and evolutionary theory on the other 
combined effectively to undermine any confidence in the notion of a 
divinely inspired and ordained morality. According to Eliot, they 
compelled one to conclude that all notions of the ethical, and even of the 
divine, belonged properly to the realm of the human: 
the fellowship between man and man which has been the 
principle of development, social and moral, is not 
dependent on conceptions of what is not man: and . . . the 
idea of God, so far as it has been a high spiritual influence, 
is the ideal of a goodness entirely human (i.e., an exultation 
of the human). (GEL, VI, 98) 
Although she understood the linked phenomena of God and 




certain ethical values rooted in Christianity. For Eliot, the challenge 
became grounding these standards within a natural context and 
validating them in the want of God. When Eliot began composing novels, 
she endeavored to demonstrate that the standards held as transcendent 
by the world’s religions could be comprehended and enacted in 
naturalistic ways. 
Reading Feuerbach’s The Essence of Christianity, Eliot discovers the 
bridge that would carry her from transcendental spiritualism toward 
naturalism—from God to Man. And it was with a premonition of the 
crucial that she set about translating a work destined to be intricately 
bound up with her life and work.  
In a memorable scene from The Mill on the Floss, Eliot describes 
how, at a critical time early in life, the heroine Maggie Tulliver reads 
Thomas à Kempis’s Imitation of Christ and as a result converts to a 
doctrine of renunciation: 
She took up the little, old, clumsy book with some curiosity; 
it had the corners turned down in many places, and some 
hand, now forever quiet, had made at certain passages 
strong pen-and-ink marks, long since browned by time. 
Maggie turned from leaf to leaf, and read where the quiet 
hand pointed: “Know that the love of thyself doth hurt thee 
more than anything in the world…. If thou seekest this or 
that, and wouldst be here or there to enjoy thy own will and 
pleasure, thou shalt never be quiet nor free from care; for in 
everything somewhat will be wanting, and in every place 




There exist only fragmentary comments suggesting any such 
conversion Mary Ann Evans may have undergone while reading The 
Essence of Christianity. However, her letters indicate that she agreed 
“everywhere” with Feuerbach’s influential ideas (GEL, II, 153; VI, 98). 
It seems inescapable that for Evans, as for so many others at the 
time, Feuerbach’s ideas certified, confirmed, and further clarified her 
inner feelings, only nascent at one time but substantively extant. Like 
Maggie, Evans immerses herself in a hugely influential book at a critical 
time in her life. About marriage, she reads from The Essence of Christianity:  
Marriage—we mean, of course, marriage as the free bond of 
love—is sacred in itself, by the very nature of the union 
which is therein effected. That alone is a religious marriage, 
which is a true marriage, which corresponds to the essence 
of marriage—love ... Yes, only as the free bond of love; for a 
marriage the bond of which is merely an external 
restriction, not the voluntary, contented self-restriction of 
love, in short, a marriage which is not spontaneously 
concluded, spontaneously willed, self-suffering, is not a true 
marriage, and therefore not a truly moral marriage. (TEOC 
271) 
Here, perhaps for the first time, Evans comes to understand the meaning 
of Feuerbach’s “I” and “Thou”:  
The other is my thou—the relation being reciprocal, my alter 
ego, man objective to me, the revelation of my own nature, 
the eye seeing itself. In another I first have the 
consciousness of humanity; through him I first learn, I first 
feel, that I am a man; in my love for him it is first clear to me 




without each other, that only community constitutes 
humanity. (TEOC 158) 
And with startling force:  
The ego . . . attains to consciousness of the world through 
consciousness of the thou. Thus man is the God of man 
(Homo homini Deus). That he is, he has to thank Nature; that 
he is man, he has to thank man ... Only where man suns and 
warms himself in the proximity of man arise feeling and 
imagination. Love, which requires mutuality, is the spring 
of poetry; and only where man communicates with man, 
only in speech, a social act, awakes reason. (TEOC 83) 
And finally,  
The divine being is nothing else than the human being, or, 
rather the human nature purified, freed from the limits of 
the individual man, made objective—i.e., contemplated and 
revered as another, a distinct being. All the attributes of the 
divine nature are, there- fore, attributes of the human nature 
... What man withdraws from himself, what he renounces in 
himself, he only enjoys in an incomparably higher and 
fuller measure in God ... To enrich God, man must become 
poor; that God may be all, man must be nothing ... He who 
makes God act humanly, declares human activity to be 
divine; he says, A god who is not active, and not morally or 
humanly active, is no god; and thus he makes the idea of 
the Godhead dependent on the idea of activity, that is, of 
human activity, for a higher he knows not. (TEOC 14, 26, 29) 
The words of Feuerbach, “God is Man’s relinquished self,” would 
command an exigent place in Eliot’s life and work. After Eliot reads 
Feuerbach, God exists for her only as the reification of the best in man. 




Spinoza held sway over Eliot’s social vision through his Ethics. 
Spinoza advocated the idea that individuals possess inherent God-like 
traits and that each person holds a moral duty to foster and promote 
those traits. Because people exist interdependently, they must always be 
aware that their acts impinge upon others. As a result, Spinoza 
emphasized forbearance and inclusion. Spinoza also advocated freedom, 
especially from constraints, including liberation from purposefulness and 
other limiting goals. Freedom brings knowledge, Spinoza held; increased 
freedom results in a more felicitous life. 
The Ethics can be considered a decisive text for Eliot. Instead of 
merely supplementing her knowledge of the classical idea of sympathy, it 
gives Eliot a fresh outlook on her own writing. Understanding Spinoza 
helps Eliot in her effort to thematize her novels; however, his influence on 
her operates not only at the level of theme but also as a structural and 
organizational guide for her novels. In the nine years from 1847 to 1856, 
when she completed her translation, Spinoza preoccupied Eliot’s 
thoughts. In the twenty-odd months it took Eliot to finish her translation, 
she found herself immersed in Spinoza’s ideas. 
Isobel Armstrong’s essay, “George Eliot, Spinoza, and the 
Emotions,” makes an argument for the formative stimulus of Spinoza’s 




Armstrong shows that studying Spinoza’s stressing of the powerful 
societal interactions of love and hate, empathy and jealousy, need and 
pain, enables a comprehension of Eliot’s work and helps to displace the 
customary mode of essentially rational sympathy usually deployed when 
analyzing her art. 
Spinoza’s elaboration of the divided character of human desires, 
the intersections of constructive and destructive influences, and the 
ideological dynamics of love and hate (especially with regard to race and 
class) lead to important observations about the more demanding and 
disconcerting elements of Eliot’s novels. Instances of these elements can 
be found in Dorothea’s witnessing in Middlemarch of Will’s interplay with 
Rosamond and specific parallels in the dual narratives of Daniel Deronda, 
both of which display aspects of jealousy, angst, and projection. Eliot’s 
optimistic social vision cannot be separated from her insight into the 
inexorable nature of controlling passions. 
Spinoza’s formative influence can be sensed in Eliot’s fiction all the 
way through Daniel Deronda, in fact, especially in that novel. Eliot linked 
Spinoza and Jewishness, not simply because he was Jewish (although he 
had been excommunicated), but because during the time she translated 
the Ethics Jewishness dominated her German life. Eliot’s companion 




their friend Ludwig Dessoir, German actor and son of a Jewish 
tradesman. In her journal, Eliot describes the tenor of the performance: 
I was amused to see that the young women’s feeling 
towards the Jews was not much above that of Gratiano and 
co. Frau Gruppe when running through the wonderful 
speech “Hath not a Jew eyes” etc turned round to us and 
said “They don’t feel – they don’t care how they are used.” 
(GEJ 39) 
“The mind does not err from the fact that it imagines.” Eliot’s 
longhand translation of Spinoza’s Ethics highlights this sentence. 
Mistakes occur when failing to comprehend the boundaries of the various 
epistemological types: when treating, for example, the output of the 
imagination as identical to that of reason. Embracing features of 
Feuerbach’s and Spinoza’s thought, Eliot approaches the imagination as a 
wellspring of wisdom. The imagination for Eliot serves as an essential 
source for gaining wisdom because it emotionally and intellectually links 
human beings to other individuals and to the whole of society. 
Eliot understood that the empathetic imagination permits human 
beings to place themselves in the position of others and therefore attain 
an awareness of and empathy for their situations. Such a capacity 
becomes particularly important, given that from Eliot’s perspective, there 
exists no spiritual being, no God, to instantiate truth or goodness. Even 




a ground for morality. Consensus on moral issues being elusive, Eliot 
argues that “we turn to the truth of feeling as the only universal bond of 
union” (GEL, I 162). In Eliot’s assessment, this “truth of feeling” becomes 
available only by properly using the imagination and its capacity to link 
human beings through sympathy. 
Notwithstanding the span of time that divides them, Spinoza and 
Feuerbach fundamentally agree on the subject of religion. Feuerbach’s 
History of Modern Philosophy ratified Spinoza’s segregation of theological 
and philosophical matters and provided a restatement of his Tractatus 
Theologico-Politicus: “The value and function [of religion] is a practical 
one, uniquely; it is to lead those who are not determined by reason to 
dutifulness, virtue and happiness.” Feuerbach’s essential analysis of 
religion contains nothing distinctively innovative, except for its one 
reversal. Man creates God in his own image: “By his God thou knowest 
the man, and by the man his God.” Religious devotion becomes 
necessarily human-centric, and Feuerbach’s inversion of the maxim from 
Genesis, “God made man in his own image,” replays Spinoza’s wisecrack 
that “if a triangle could speak, it would say . . . that God is eminently 





Feuerbach plays the part of observant auditor and allows religion 
to issue its pronouncements. He presents an anthropological analysis of 
the Bible, characterizing it as “man’s earliest and also [most] indirect form 
of self-knowledge” (TEOC 13). Religion revolves around the introspective 
qualities of human beings but only in a covert or suppressed and 
imaginative fashion (33). In Feuerbach’s formulation, religion hinges on 
illusion, but it offers not simply illusion but exigent revelations about 
human thought and essence. Eliot would come to enthusiastically 
embrace this particular point. 
Every location in The Essence of Christianity that echoes Spinoza’s 
dictum, “man is God to man” (83, 159, 271) displays Feuerbach asserting 
the innate importance of human existence. Moral relations do not depend 
upon a spiritual godhead. Morality develops from natural associations, 
and Feuerbach regards these moral associations as innately inviolable 
(TEOC 273). Human thankfulness, feeling, and esteem should be guided 
not toward abstract religious concepts—the Virgin Mary, God the father, 
the crucified Jesus—but in the direction of deserving, living recipients: 
the parents who nurture us, the incarnate partner who counterbalances 
and absolves our shortcomings, and our fellow human beings whose 
abilities and efforts reinforce each individual human life. Such tangible, 




breed concern and empathy for other human beings and ethical 
responsibility toward them. 
Asserting the duality of I and Thou, Feuerbach pushes aside the 
autonomous single individual of Western thought and, most crucially, 
uncovers Christianity’s ego-centrism. A person survives “only by virtue 
of the conditions which constitute him a member of the whole, or a 
relative whole” (171). Only collectively do man and woman make a 
complete person. Only collectively do human beings attain their potential 
for wisdom, ethics, and integrity. 
To the degree that he proposes the I-Thou dyad as a prerequisite to 
individualism and regards the existence of other human beings as the 
precursor of philosophic thought, Feuerbach presents a key relational 
example that would profoundly influence George Eliot’s thought and 
work. Abstract dichotomies—mind and body, reason and emotion—
become displaced by an incarnate dualism that tolerates and accepts 
changeable relations: this dualism would emerge throughout Eliot’s 
fiction in the myriad associations between friends, martial partners, and 
communities. 
The third major influence on Eliot’s social vision, Auguste Comte, 
founded Positivism, a philosophical system that recognized as valid only 




epistemological character of Positivism in Cours de philosophie positive (The 
Course in Positive Philosophy), a group of books published between 1830 
and 1842. 
This series of works preceded the 1844 book, A General View of 
Positivism (published in French 1848, English in 1865). The first triad of 
the Cours books treats primarily the extant physical sciences (astronomy, 
biology, chemistry, mathematics, physics), whereas the fourth and fifth 
emphasize the inexorable arrival of the social sciences. Comte can be 
considered, in the recent definition of the term, the original philosopher 
of science. According to Comte, the physical sciences had to come first, 
before society could adequately direct its attention toward the most 
demanding and intricate “Queen science”: the study of human 
civilization. Therefore, Comte’s View of Positivism sought to establish the 
objectives of the sociological process. The main vehicle for the articulation 
of the method was the Systeme de politique positive (1851-54), the four 
volumes of which explored the political, social, and religious nature of 
the society Comte envisaged. 
Comte became a major force in nineteenth-century philosophy, 
informing the thought of intellectuals such as Mill and Marx as well as 
Eliot. Positivism maintained that all knowledge allows verification. 




observation and theory—would eventually displace metaphysics in the 
history of ideas. Comte denied the presence of a Divine but believed that 
one has a duty to be philanthropic. Essentially, for Comte, people should 
be what others need them to be. 
Eliot examined Comte’s writings, audited speeches on his method, 
mingled with his British followers, and contributed funds to advance his 
public standing. Even so, she refused to join the Comtean faction, as is 
made clear in her personal relations with close acquaintances like 
Frederic Harrison and Richard Congreve, both fully convinced 
Positivists. The more these friends sought to include her in the group, the 
more she moved away. 
Eliot’s longstanding acquaintance with Positivist thought derived 
from various sources. By 1851 she had already absorbed the central thesis 
of Comte’s Cours; she referred to it in an essay for the Westminster Review, 
alluding sympathetically to those who hold “with Auguste Comte, that 
theological and metaphysical speculation have reached their limit, and 
that the only hope of extending man’s sources of knowledge and 
happiness is to be found in positive science.” Five years later, in “The 
Natural History of German Life,” she paraphrased Comte’s argument 
concerning the evolution of positive science: 
To Chemistry, the laws of quantity of quality; comprised to 




Biology, are laws superadded, of life; and in lastly, the 
conditions of life in general, branch out into its special 
conditions, or Natural History, on the one hand, and into its 
abnormal conditions, or Pathology, on the other. (Essays 
290) 
Eliot’s commentary suggests not only familiarity with Comte’s 
views in the Cours but acknowledgment of their general correctness. The 
mastery of this second point gives Eliot practical control of the two 
leading ideas of Comte: the concept of historical stages, whereby a 
theological worldview and then a metaphysical one were replaced in turn 
by a positive, scientific outlook; and the gradual emergence of new 
positive sciences out of earlier ones, whereby it became possible by the 
beginning of the nineteenth century to study man and human society 
with scientific certitude. 
During the early 1850s, Eliot’s interest in Comte increased by 
virtue of her growing intimacy with Lewes, then considered one of 
Comte’s leading spokesmen in England. She worked closely with Lewes 
in preparing for publication Comte’s Philosophy of the Sciences, a faithful 
synthesis and condensation of the Cours. 
Having become a neighbor of the Congreves in 1859, she read 
quite eagerly Comte’s Catechisme positiviste, which Richard Congreve had 
translated the previous year. Throughout the next decade, Comte 




upon returning, immediately wrote to Mrs Congreve that “the most 
interesting sight we saw was Comte’s dwelling. Such places, that knew 
the great dead, always move me deeply” (GEL, IV, 176). Although she 
agreed with Sara Hennell “in regarding Positivism as one-sided,” she 
insisted in the same letter (13 July 1861) that “Comte was a great thinker, 
nevertheless, and ought to be treated with reverence by all smaller fry” 
(GEL, III, 439). She accepted and read the volume of Comte’s Systeme de 
politique positive that Richard Congreve gave her in 1866, subsequently 
writing in her letter to Mrs Congreve, “Will you give my thanks to Mr 
Congreve for the ‘Synthèse,’ which I have brought with me and I am 
reading? I expect to understand the three chapters well enough to get 
some edification” (GEL, IV, 227). 
George Eliot’s association with Positivism cannot be separated 
from her relationship with George Lewes, “the chief representative to 
most reading English-men of the Positive Philosophy.” The influence 
traveled both ways. When she reviewed an article on Comte for the Leader 
in May I854, she apologized deferentially for the absence of “the writer to 
whom the exposition of Comte in the Leader peculiarly belongs.” But 
when he described himself as a “reverent heretic” with regard to the 
Religion of Humanity in the Fortnightly Review twelve years later, he 




certainly regarded her as the sounder disciple, blaming him for “keeping 
Marian back from better things.” Lewes took up Comte after reading 
Mill’s Logic in 1842 and was soon trumpeting his merits. His Biographical 
History of Philosophy of I845-46 portrays Positivism as the culmination of 
western thought. In 1846 began also a friendly but unphilosophical 
correspondence between Lewes and Comte which lasted on and off until 
1853. Lewes used the Leader as a vehicle for the propagation of Positivism 
from I850 to I854. A series of articles from that paper formed the first half 
of his exposition of Comte’s Philosophy of the Sciences in 1853, a copy of 
which he presented to George Eliot (GEL, I I26). In the “Biographical 
Introduction,” he makes no secret of his allegiance to Positivism, which 
had given him “the sustaining Faith which previous speculation had 
shattered.” But this did not prevent Lewes from dissenting from some of 
Comte’s views. His main purpose was exposition rather than comment, 
although he expressed occasional reservations, for instance over Comte’s 
religion and cerebral theory. “Abstinence from criticism,” he explained, 
should not be interpreted as assent. Nevertheless, his enthusiasm for 
Positivism remained unmistakable. 
George Eliot read Comte on the Middle Ages in July I86I in 
preparation for Romola, praising his treatment in a letter to Sara Hennell. 




writing Romola occurs in her “Italian Notes, 1862.” After a number of 
historical details, she suddenly added two entirely different entries: 
“Influence of egoism in determining formulae. Necessity of strong theistic 
feeling as a preparation for the Religion of Humanity.” A few pages later 
she copied Comte’s disparaging remarks about half-hearted disciples: 
“Quelques esprits excentriques comprennent le droit d’examiner comme 
imposant le devoir de ne se decider jamais” (“Some eccentric minds 
include the right to examine imposing the duty of never deciding”). Eliot 
wrote to Mrs Congreve in November I863 that she “was swimming in 
Comte” at the time she wrote Romola (GEL, IV, 116). This reference would 
seem to lend credence to a reading of the novel as a Positivist allegory, 
wherein Eliot’s female character traverses Comte’s three phases, mapping 
through her own life the journey of humanity. 
In 1866, Eliot copied into her notebook for Felix Holt an interesting 
discussion by Comte of the extent to which theological faith encourages 
egoism under different conditions. The day before she began the novel, 
she started again on “Comte’s Social Science in Miss Martineau’s 
edition.”5 Once again, this proves nothing about the novel itself, but it 
                                                
5 Harriet Martineau translated and condensed Comte’s work. Published in two volumes 
by John Chapman in 1855 as The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte: Freely Translated 
and Condensed by Harriet Martineau, the work remains in print and can be accessed also in 




provides support for the attribution to Comte of some influence on Felix 
Holt’s political and philosophical creed. 
Feuerbach, Spinoza, and Comte sketched out the core ideas that 
informed George Eliot’s social vision, such as concepts of the dimension 
of moral accountability, a universe causally determined, and the 
significance of human community. All three thinkers held a deterministic 
perspective of the universe, gained principally through deduction, 
though the Positivism of Feuerbach and Comte emphasized history’s 
evolutionary quality while Spinoza held that societies advance as an 
increasing number of individuals within a society develop “adequate 
ideas.” Through these ideas, individuals comprehend their relation to 
true substance and take particular moral choices as a result. The laws of 
causation embraced by Comte and Feuerbach explained the 
interrelatedness of phenomena. These laws held true for Spinoza as well, 
but he also concerned himself with the significance of individual action 
upon and within societies. Due to the universe’s remaining 
fundamentally static, human acts founded on incomplete wisdom and 
extreme emotion caused error, “evil,” misery, and “bondage,” while acts 
founded on instinct and rationality led to happiness and liberty. 




advancements in humanity’s knowledge, Spinoza would regard as the 
ongoing routine of substituting acceptable ideas for inferior ones. 
Several of Eliot’s books treat the interactional strain between 
individuals and society. Eliot makes clear that man needs society, a 
concept that repeats Spinoza’s and Feuerbach’s maxim of “man’s love for 
man.” The threat of estrangement from society often serves as the 
severest penalty Eliot administers to the figures in her novels, such as to 
Arthur and Hetty in Adam Bede and Maggie in The Mill on the Floss. 
Society’s deterministic character, however, informs the relationship 
between each individual and society; Eliot’s novels present the edicts of 
causation as they govern human lives. She forces numerous characters to 
internalize difficult lessons by witnessing the outcomes of human acts. 
Once more, Eliot injects into human activity Comte’s positivist ideas 
rooted in science. However, Spinoza’s recommended approach to acquire 
“adequate ideas” by way of “observed facts and deduction based on 
cause and effect relationships” seems equally conveyed. Eliot embeds 
these concepts within her plots. Adam’s arduous ethical instruction in 
Adam Bede, the suffering endured by Mrs Transome as a result of her 
previous behavior in Felix Holt, and Romola’s finding in Romola that 




both Comte’s principles of cause and effect and Spinoza’s insistence on 
the value of experiential knowledge. 
Works produced by these three theorists—Feuerbach, Spinoza, 
and Comte—provided the original impetus for Eliot’s social ideas, ideas 
she would subsequently and vividly convey in her fiction. In a reciprocal 
and mildly ironic way, Eliot acted in turn as a carrier of Feuerbach’s and 
Spinoza’s ideas, ideas that loomed large within the German higher 
criticism movement, synthesizing and passing them along to her British 
readers. The influence of the German movement on nineteenth-century 
British thought therefore owes much to George Eliot. 
Eliot became one of the earliest figures in England to suggest the 
novel’s moral promise and to consider it a suitable conveyance for 
advanced philosophic ideas. Indeed, Eliot’s enunciation of her social 
vision hinges upon this ethical potential. Eliot’s novels should be 
understood as attempts to convey her ideas about society in a 
nonconformist fashion. Her choice to compose fiction instead of standard 
philosophical works suggests a wish to incentivize the creative and 
emotional, along with the intellectual, capacities of her audience. In 
Eliot’s opinion, imaginative activity generates one’s inclination to feel 
sympathy for fellow human beings. She seeks to depict in her novels this 




The extent of Eliot’s influence evinces both the potency of fiction as 
a form of social commentary and its popularity in mid-nineteenth-
century Britain. With the spread of literacy and the increasing availability 
of inexpensive books and newspapers, reading had become democratized 
as never before. The repeated attempts in nineteenth-century critiques of 
literature to link public ethics with the novel, the joining of fiction and 
fact in the industrial novels of the mid-century, and the reliance on 
didactic fiction even in Evangelical pamphlets, all attest to the profound 
relevance of fiction to public life and to its capacity not merely to reflect 
but to amplify and deepen public debate. Seen within this context, Dinah 
Mulock’s description of the novel, published in an 1861 issue of 
Macmillan’s Magazine, seems apt: 
[The novel is] one of the most important moral agents of the 
community. The essayist may write for his hundreds, the 
preacher preach for his thousands; but the novelist counts 
his audience by millions. His power is three-fold—over 
heart, reason, and fancy. (442) 
Feuerbach and Spinoza each explored the functions of emotion, 
imagination, and reason in the acquisition of moral wisdom. Both 
described the relationships informing these attributes and insisted upon 
their reformation. Eliot attempts in her novels precisely this reformative 
task. Spinoza’s holistic thought surfaces throughout Eliot’s fiction. She 




reason as separate and divided. Eliot understands, as do Feuerbach and 
Spinoza, that these divisions emanate largely from religion, particularly 
Christianity. 
With her novels, Eliot sets into motion a new form of philosophical 
writing. However, her novels should not be characterized as providing 
literary cover for philosophical thought. Eliot rejects in no uncertain 
terms this portrayal as hostile to the basic principles of her authorial 
routine. When an acquaintance, Frederic Harrison, suggests to Eliot that 
she devise a novel conveying the thought of Auguste Comte as a way of 
promoting Positivism, Eliot resolutely declines, explaining that such a 
project would contradict her obligation to compose straightforward and 
representative work that “deals with life in its highest complexity.” 
Notwithstanding Eliot’s deployment of the novel as a serious medium for 
conveying her ideas about society, commentators seldom approach her 
novels and her social vision as an authentically cohesive entity. Many 
cogent critiques of her intellectual milieu exist, but, surprisingly, much 
remains to be said about Eliot’s literary inscription of her social vision 
and its lasting influence. 
Spinoza, Feuerbach, and Comte offered a diagnosis of the state of 
humanity; Eliot pursues a prognosis. Investigating what assets society 




accountability for human life, Eliot determines those assets to be 
imagination and sympathy regulated by intellect. The influence appears 
in Eliot’s ideas about the functions that intellect, feeling, and imagination 
ought to perform in living. For Eliot, the exercise of these parts working 
harmoniously together precedes the attainment of moral wisdom. Instead 
of writing a philosophical discourse promoting this concept as a mere 
hypothesis, and thereby try to generate intellectual accord with her 
audience, Eliot’s fiction attempts to embody this call to moral wisdom. 
Her novels attempt to involve and motivate the sum total of her 
audience’s intellectual, affective, and imaginative powers. 
Having seen the crucial influence exerted upon Eliot by Spinoza, 
Feuerbach, and Comte, it becomes important to identify specific social 
tenets derived from them that infuse her novels. First, the notion that 
“man is god to man” stipulates that the ambitions and accomplishments 
of humanity reside only in communal, natural human life. Second, in 
order to permit ethical associations, each human being must first conquer 
an innate egocentrism. Such egocentrism blocks the path to self-
knowledge achieved by interacting with others. Third, if moral life is to 
be delivered from traditional religion and a decaying aristocracy, then 




and study how to redeem themselves through reflection, sympathy, and 
imagination. 
Finally, and most importantly for the focus of this project, 
humankind’s manner of existence consists in relationships: people come 
to terms with who and what they are, or might become, by engaging with 
others within a human community. This sympathetic concept emanates 
directly from the thinking of Feuerbach, especially his I-Thou 
formulation, with the interaction between the sexes forming an important 
aspect. 
All of these processes can be best understood in evolutionary 
terms. Indeed, Eliot came to picture society itself as an ongoing 
invention—a collective, imaginative act proposed and tested piecemeal, 
defeated or established much as scientific hypotheses are, maintained and 
revised continually by the common force of individual acts of choice and 
judgment. Eliot’s novels refuse to propose a moral hypothesis but instead 
offer a fictional, evolving world, as multifaceted as the medium can 
tolerate, through which she conveys a vision of society—a vision both of 







“Between the I and the Thou”: 
George Eliot’s Diction of Hierarchy and Deliverance 
 
The distinction between the I and the Thou, between the 
individual and the species, is the distinction between the 
essential and the superficial, between what is closer and 
what is more distant, between the higher and the lower. 
—Ludwig Feuerbach 
 
Born near Nuneaton, Warwickshire in 1819, Mary Ann Evans grew 
up on a landed estate in the Midlands. Her father, Robert Evans, 
managed the Arbury Hall Estate, and her childhood spent on its South 
Farm allowed Mary Ann to calculate the vast difference between the 
affluence in which the resident property owner lived and the condition of 
the indigent persons living nearby. Disparate lives lived in parallel would 
often reemerge in her fiction.  
Like many other English people in the mid-nineteenth century, 
George Eliot would leave behind the countryside and live the remainder 





and later London.6 Yet, with the single exception of The Mill on the Floss, 
Eliot sets all her English novels in a locale dominated either by a great 
park and manor house—the Donnithorne estate in Adam Bede, Transome 
Court in Felix Holt, Tipton and Freshitt in Middlemarch, Diplow and 
Monk’s Topping in Daniel Deronda—or, in Silas Marner, by a large farm 
which stands in for the manor house and sits atop the social hierarchy of 
the local community. 
Even when Eliot’s dramatis personae do not belong to the privileged 
landed classes, they mix to a greater or lesser degree in those circles: 
Adam Bede, a lowly carpenter, knows his place, but his boyhood friend 
Arthur happens to be the young squire. This blending of privileged and 
non-privileged characters effectively blurs the dividing lines of social 
ranking in Eliot’s fiction; simultaneously, it highlights her technique of 
inscribing the communitarian imperative she inherited from Feuerbach—
the need to privilege “the higher” over “the lower,” that is, the welfare of 
                                                
6 In Migration, Mobility and Modernization (2000) David Siddle points out that British 
migration from rural to urban areas that occurred around the time that Eliot published 
her first fiction had a circular character. In the harvest season, people worked in the 
countryside and the remainder of the time in the cities. As time went on, more and more 
people could not fall back on the countryside, and circle migration became chain 
migration. Cities with textile or heavy-industry attracted laborers as did commercial and 
administrative centers. People from all over Europe (after 1861 also from Eastern 
Europe) and even from other continents moved toward the new industry centers in 
England, as they did also in France and Germany. The Industrial Revolution introduced 




the general community over the concerns of the single individual. The 
narrator of Adam Bede provides an apt example of Eliot’s blending 
technique: 
Hetty was quite certain her uncle wanted her to encourage 
Adam, and would be pleased for her to marry him. For 
those were times when there was no rigid demarcation of 
rank between the farmer and the respectable artisan, and on 
the home hearth, as well as in the public house, they might 
be seen taking their jug of ale together; the farmer having a 
latent sense of capital, and of weight in parish affairs, which 
sustained him under his conspicuous inferiority in 
conversation. (AB, ch 9) 
The farmer’s “latent sense of capital” and the moments of “no rigid 
demarcation of rank between the farmer and the respectable artisan” 
bring to mind the binding interdependence of Feuerbach’s I-Thou dyad, 
the chain of connection linking the higher and lower ranks, that keeps 
social life orderly and under control in Eliot’s novels. Even linen-weaver 
Silas Marner, whose “protuberant eyes” and “pale face” cast him as a 
misproportioned, unfortunate figure, defies strict hierarchical boundaries 
as he comes into close contact with the wealthy small gentry. It is 
tempting to think that Eliot replays in these backdrops the historical shift 
from a hierarchical social order dominated by a closed system of power 
vested in the land and wealth of the aristocracy and gentry, a system 
described in the diction of rank, to a social order defined by economic 




At the same time, however, Eliot deeply attaches to the old 
traditions and institutions. Her intellectual commitment to the notion of a 
human community—a constitutively relational society based on 
Feuerbach’s ideas of mutual dependency and duty—links simultaneously 
to anachronistic social forms based on privilege and maintained by rites 
of deference and obligation. Eliot’s ethical concerns, in other words, link 
to what might be termed her social conservatism and not simply to her 
more obvious evangelistic motivation. Indeed, “That recognition of 
something to be lived for beyond the mere satisfaction of self” (“Janet’s 
Repentance,” ch 10) involves also a recognition of and resignation to 
social inequality. 
George Eliot published her first fictional work, Scenes of Clerical 
Life, a collection of three short stories, in Blackwood’s Magazine during the 
year 1857. The three stories—”The Sad Fortunes of the Reverend Amos 
Barton,” “Mr Gilfil’s Love Story,” and “Janet’s Repentance”—take place 
in and around the fictional town of Milby in the English Midlands. When 
in her first story Eliot stakes out the social terrain of her fiction as “the 
debatable ground between aristocracy and commonalty” (SCL, ch 4), her 
adopting the diction of hierarchy to describe social relations in Milby in 




longer seem quite so simple. Eliot’s narrator sketches her heroine’s family 
home as 
just large enough to be called a mansion, and … moderately 
rented, having no manor attached to it, and being rather 
difficult to let with its sombre furniture and faded 
upholstery. 
The narration then evolves, invoking the “border-territory of rank,” 
thereby suggesting a more complicated milieu: 
But inside and outside it was what no beholder could 
suppose to be inhabited by retired trades-people: a certainty 
which was worth many conveniences to tenants who not 
only had the taste that shrinks from new finery, but also 
were in that border-territory of rank where annexation is a 
burning topic: and to take up her abode in a house which 
had once sufficed for dowager countesses gave a 
perceptible tinge to Mrs. Davilow’s satisfaction in having an 
establishment of her own. (DD, ch 3) 
Indeed, the Davilows move, as do Jane Austen’s genteel families, in 
gentry circles. But Daniel Deronda, written in the mid-1870s and set in the 
mid-1860s, explores not the gentry but bizarre social hierarchies. It begins 
with countesses and tradesmen together at the gaming tables, in “a 
striking admission of human equality” (DD, ch 1), and follows the restless 
lives of those newly formed, still-to-be-defined social groupings—a 
shifting structure with a marked gradation of landowners, tenant 
farmers, countesses, dealers, craftsman, and laborers. As Raymond 




pressure affecting a previously stable rural milieu but from social and 
economic conflicts already endemic in the nineteenth-century 
environment.7 
Eliot’s setting seems to imply quite a different “border-territory,” 
one which suggests that her usage of the word “rank” in a novel with 
such a consciously contemporary sensibility must be considered 
deliberate. Eliot seems wary of “class” as a hierarchical descriptor: wary 
that the struggles of competing economic groups should underpin all 
social description and wary of the diction of social description itself, 
which might be characterized as a calculated intervention in society. Once 
social experience becomes “wrought back to the directness of sense like 
the solidity of objects” (MM, ch 21), in the everyday face-to-face dealings 
of one person with another, class stands revealed as synthetic—as 
constructed. Thus, Eliot chooses provincial social life as paradigmatic of 
“our old society” (Essays 421), the society which has “grown up 
historically” and predates by centuries a class-based society. 
Provincial settings offer Eliot a local particularity which resists 
sociological generalization: she wants most of all to convey the truth 
about these characters, about the society they inhabit. In so tightly 
                                                
7 Raymond Williams’s Culture and Society: 1780-1950, one foundational text of British 
cultural materialism, addresses in its conclusion the idea of community and a “common 





focusing her scenes—Loamshire cannot be confused with Stonyshire, 
even if it exists next door; Treby Magna is not Middlemarch—she also 
contests the assumption, in place by 1860, that these societies were, a 
generation earlier, already part of that larger overarching structure, class-
based society. So when Eliot writes about the “subtle movement” of 
social groups in “old provincial society,” she unreservedly deploys a 
diction of hierarchy to describe various fluctuations and slippages in 
social ranking: 
Old provincial society had its share of this subtle 
movement: had not only its striking downfalls, its brilliant 
young professional dandies who ended by living up an 
entry with a drab and six children for their establishment, 
but also those less marked vicissitudes which are constantly 
shifting the boundaries of social intercourse, and begetting 
new consciousness of interdependence. Some slipped a little 
downward, some got higher footing: people denied 
aspirates, gained wealth, and fastidious gentlemen stood for 
boroughs; some were caught in political currents, some in 
ecclesiastical, and perhaps found themselves surprisingly 
grouped in consequence; while a few personages or families 
that stood with rocky firmness amid all this fluctuation, 
were slowly presenting new aspects in spite of solidity, and 
altering with the double change of self and beholder. (MM, 
ch 11) 
Setting her fiction in small rural communities offers Eliot a model 
of social relations as thoroughly modern in economic terms, but it also 
complicates her narrative structuring of social hierarchies. Eliot describes 




three generations, in which there had naturally been much intermarrying 
with neighbors more or less decidedly genteel.” However, while Mr 
Vincy’s sister “made a wealthy match in accepting Mr. Bulstrode,” 
Bulstrode does not enjoy the special status of having been born in the 
town; owing to his “dimly known origin,” the townspeople regard 
Bulstrode as fortunate—having “done well in uniting himself with a real 
Middlemarch family” (MM, ch 11). 
Mayor Vincy’s fluctuating wealth and status—the novel’s diction 
casts his social ranking as “descended a little, having taken an 
innkeeper’s daughter”—derive from his ownership of a ribbon factory, a 
factory that hires local wage labor. He registers less as a Middlemarcher 
and more as a capitalist who might have invested his capital anywhere. 
Provincial life being insular, however, and tools of communication and 
conveyance being much less advanced during the 1820s, small-town 
social interactions functioned in practice very much as local interactions. 
As Lydgate finds, it seems virtually impossible to evade the “particular 
web” of interdependence in a small town, or the “hampering threadlike 
pressure of small social conditions, and their frustrating complexity” 
(MM, ch 18). This “interdependence” also leads to a certain fluidity, that 




County society and town society constitute the two intersecting 
axes of provincial life in Eliot’s English fiction. County society mixes 
variously ranked occupations: landowners and tenant farmers (who may 
be well-heeled, as the Poysers on the Donnithorne estate in Adam Bede, or 
not-so-well-heeled, as the Dagleys on Brooke’s estate in Middlemarch), 
rural artisans (skilled workmen such as Adam Bede or Caleb Garth), and 
agricultural laborers. Eliot takes quite seriously the accurate depiction of 
these different ranks and occupations. She explicitly warns in “The 
Natural History of German Life” that “our social novels profess to 
represent the people as they are, and the unreality of their representations 
is a grave evil.” Extending this admonition against straying from reality 
in fictional representation, Eliot cites Scott, Wordsworth, Kingsley, Alton 
Locke, and Hornung as affirmative models of rendering character, of 
“linking the higher classes with the lower” and “obliterating the vulgarity 
of exclusiveness”: 
When Scott takes us into Luckie Mucklebackit’s cottage, or 
tells the story of “The Two Drover,”—when Wordsworth 
sings to us the reverie of “Poor Susan,”—when Kingsley 
shows us Alton Locke gazing yearningly over the gate 
which leads from the highway into the first wood he ever 
saw,—when Hornung paints a group of chimney-
sweepers,—more is done towards linking the higher classes 
with the lower, towards obliterating the vulgarity of 
exclusiveness, than by hundreds of sermons and 




Eliot's negative invocation of “hundreds of sermons” and 
“philosophical dissertations” brings to mind that, for all the philosophical 
interests she held when she began writing fiction, Eliot's early reading of 
David Strauss alerted her to the ways in which narrative, as opposed to 
moral preachments or philosophical tracts, binds people together into 
communities. Eliot would aim her rhetorical strategies accordingly. 
Strauss’s controversial study enabled Eliot to see supposedly miraculous 
events, particularly those in the New Testament, as potent narrative 
dramatizations of mythical happenings. This elucidation of narrative 
power helped to cement in Eliot a dedication to the fictional expression of 
her own philosophical concepts. As we shall see, Eliot seeks to implant in 
her audience a deep sympathy for her characters and the dramatic 
situations within which they live and struggle. Influenced by Strauss (and 
Scott, Wordsworth, and Kingsley), Eliot realizes that linking readers to 
realistic characters and events serves her strategic ends more effectively 
than attempting to connect them to the bloodless abstractions of 
“philosophical dissertations.” Eliot subscribes to the principle that 
narrative persuasion provides her with the best of both worlds, 
conveying—by “showing” rather than “telling”—the full force and depth 




more distanced, unsympathetic effects that attach to purely philosophical 
writing. 
Town society, represented in most detail in Middlemarch, 
corresponds to the commercial culture of rural England in the early 
industrial period. Eliot classes her townspeople such as Vincy as 
manufacturers, but she constructs her towns as centers of agricultural 
commerce. St Ogg’s in The Mill on the Floss seems exemplary in this 
regard. What makes St Ogg’s modern is not the existence of local 
capitalists but the existence of urban capital flowing (to adopt the novel’s 
operative metaphor) in to producers and out again as local goods and 
prices headed, via transport and communication routes, for other towns 
and ports across the country. Therefore, a clash between two rival 
producers of similar rank in a modernizing agricultural industry—not a 
local power struggle with Mr Pivart upstream—victimizes Tulliver. 
Eliot’s novel portrays hierarchies of town professionals and businessmen, 
including lawyer Wakem—lawyers, most notably, but also bankers, such 
as Bulstrode in Middlemarch, as well as auctioneers and land agents—who 
function as the point of articulation between local interests and the 
interests of capital. 
No better example exists of these intersections of agricultural and 




Mill on the Floss. While Eliot defines these characters by their occupations, 
she characteristically ranks these occupations and the characters engaged 
in them as equal in a hierarchical sense. Eliot casts Tulliver as a 
mortgaged small businessman: a mill owner, whose flour-making 
business turns local agricultural produce (grown by poor tenant farmers 
like his brother-in-law, Moss) into goods headed, via transport on the 
river and canal systems, to national food markets. The character Bob 
Jakin, who prospers as a small trader, emphasizes the dominance of the 
local import-export markets. The husbands of the Dodson sisters also 
reflect this intimate relationship between agriculture and commerce: Mr 
Deane works in a local firm (which employs Tom); Mr Glegg, now 
retired, worked as a wool stapler and Mr Pullet as a gentleman farmer. 
From her discussion of the peasantry in “The Natural History of 
German Life,” it might be anticipated that Eliot would explore the lives of 
agricultural laborers in her histories of “unfashionable families” (MF, IV, 
ch 3). There do exist certain moments when the lowest of the lower orders 
occupies her mind. In The Mill on the Floss, for instance, the narrator 
pauses to defend the novel’s “tone of emphasis,” by which Eliot means 
the vulgar stridency of its social critique. This “wide national life,” the 
narrator argues passionately, bases itself entirely on “the emphasis of 




good society, floated on gossamer wings of light irony, is of 
very expensive production; requiring nothing less than a 
wide and arduous national life condensed in unfragrant 
deafening factories, cramping itself in mines, sweating at 
furnaces, grinding, hammering, weaving under more or less 
oppression of carbonic acid—or else, spread over 
sheepwalks, and scattered in lonely houses and huts on the 
clayey or chalky cornlands, where the rainy days look 
dreary. (MF, IV, ch 3) 
Eliot highlights here, of course, the emphasis of Maggie’s wants—Maggie 
the daughter of a petty bourgeois mill owner. Interestingly, no factory 
workers populate Eliot’s fiction, and the vast coterie of agricultural 
laborers remains virtually invisible. The unworthy poor do not constitute, 
Eliot implies, the stuff of fiction. They “are not easily roused,” as the 
Reverend Irwine informs Dinah in Adam Bede (ch 8) and “take life almost 
as slowly as the sheep and cows.” He redirects Dinah’s attention to the 
“intelligent workmen” about the district as he states, “I daresay you 
know the Bedes.” 
Within Eliot’s distinctive diction of hierarchy, then, her 
representative “peasant” becomes the skilled artisan, the high-status 
craftsman laborer whose skills, passed down from master to apprentice, 
link him back to medieval times (hence the significance of the originary 
naming of Adam Bede). Independence, his control over his own work, 
characterizes the skilled artisan. As described by E. P. Thompson’s 




eighteenth century, as a vast new class of unskilled factory laborers 
emerged, a crucial identification of the rising proletariat with the proud 
tradition of independent artisans forged class-consciousness. 
Eliot, however, skeptically regards this characterization of 
traditional social rank and class identity. As a result, she ignores the real 
poor, effectively sanitizing the people of working class in order to deal 
with them. For her, the artisan embodies the ideal of a responsible, 
progressive worker. His independence safeguards him from the 
corruptions of class, that corporate form of self-interest that blinds its 
members to their responsibilities and capacities to pursue social relations 
independently and clear-sightedly; these corruptions encourage moral 
laziness and the tendency to “convenience, that admirable branch system 
from the main line of self-interest” (SCL, ch 10), in which individuals 
lived “from hand to mouth . . . with a small family of immediate desires” 
(MF, bk 1, ch 3). 
No group of people in Eliot’s fiction more enthusiastically 
embraces this convenience—doing harm to no one, just doing the best for 
themselves—than her egoistic landowners (Arthur Donnithorne, Harold 
Transome, Mr Brooke). That observation helps to explain why, in a 
number of novels, Eliot explores versions of a partnership or association 




ultimate betterment of society; Eliot thereby instantiates, albeit obliquely, 
an unlikely version of Feuerbach’s communitarianism. Thus, Adam Bede 
benefits Arthur Donnithorne; and Caleb Garth benefits Sir James Chettam 
and, especially, Mr Brooke. More broadly, Eliot writes into her social 
plots certain relationships between the ranks of leisured and productive 
“classes” (in the generic sense of that word): Godfrey Cass and Silas 
Marner; the Transomes and Felix Holt; and later, more boldly still, 
Deronda and the Mallinger-Grandcourts. 
In these plots, Eliot pushes individuals from different social 
hierarchies into contact with each other or, more commonly, to the 
peripheries of each other’s lives, in what she characterizes in Middlemarch 
as 
the stealthy convergence of human lots . . . a slow 
preparation of effects from one life on another, which tells 
like a calculated irony on the indifference or the frozen stare 
with which we look at our unintroduced neighbor. Destiny 
stands by sarcastic with our dramatis personae folded in her 
hand. (MM, ch 11) 
Eliot tends to write as latent the social relationships of these 
characters. She often represents the unseen interdependence of 
individuals and the social ranks they inhabit in ways that suggest that the 
localized settings of her fiction also characterize wider social realities. Her 




social responsibility, interdependence, and hierarchies: when all the 
“various parts” of the human body depend on one another, they are 
“likely all to feel the effect if any of them goes wrong” (Essays 420).8 
This effect obtains equally within her local communities, where 
Eliot shows obscure actions as having unseen, far-reaching 
consequences—consequences, she suggests, of national significance. This 
effect constitutes the meaning of the web in Middlemarch, the most explicit 
of the aesthetic organizing structures Eliot superimposes on social 
actuality in order to make sense of it. Middlemarch society should not be 
viewed as English society, but it does stand in for English society. It 
constitutes only one small part of it—resembling the larger stratified 
entity closely in many ways (it includes, for instance, “representatives” of 
the various ranks and occupations of English society, and of the English 
“character”). But it is itself: it has its own particularities, which restrain 
                                                
8 In a 2013 analysis of “Address to Working Men, by Felix Holt,” Robert Dingley argues 
that Eliot holds quite well-defined social interests. However, Dingley maintains that 
what some critics have regarded as Eliot’s “radical conservatism” should be viewed as 
not particularly radical but as closely allied to Tory politics. In support of this view, 
Dingley points out that Eliot’s writing betrays certain conflicts and ambiguities in what 
other critics have termed her avowed liberal creed. Although Dingley’s argument with 
respect to Eliot’s putative conservatism seems only marginally persuasive, he 
nevertheless makes cogent and useful observations regarding Eliot’s 1868 essay and its 
registering the pressure of external events—election agents planning campaigns, 
disgruntled workers rioting, and political principles being debated in pubs. In the end, 
however, Dingley presents a politically bifurcated Eliot who is neither wholly 




the empiricist narrator of Middlemarch from becoming involved in a 
misleading social allegory: 
I have so much to do in unravelling certain human lots, and 
seeing how they were woven and interwoven, that all the 
light I can command must be concentrated on this particular 
web, and not dispersed over that tempting range of 
relevancies called the universe. (MM, ch 15) 
Any discussion of Eliot’s usage of hierarchical language and social 
ranking leads inevitably to an acknowledgement that British society 
during Eliot’s lifetime was class-based, and that the age of reform was the 
age of the middle classes. But who exactly comprised these middle 
classes, and how were they arranged hierarchically and set apart from 
those above and below them? 
Answering these questions requires a brief digression into the 
origins of class-based society in Britain. As a way of describing societal 
hierarchies, the term “class” dates only from the late eighteenth century. 
Therefore, in 1819, when Mary Ann Evans came into the world, it was a 
relatively new way of thinking about the differentiation of social 
groupings (the term “working class” dates only from 1813, when Robert 
Owen first used it). Rich and poor had existed side by side, of course, 
since the very beginning of human society, and social inequality was 
especially pronounced in pre-industrial Britain. In the countryside the 




farms, villages, parish church, and common lands, which grew out of the 
integration of Norman and Saxon feudalism in the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries. It continued to exist in more complex forms after Britain had 
become industrialized and to interconnect in complex ways with the 
newer social formations growing out of industrial capitalism. Put simply, 
the earlier formation of landowners and dependent yeomen, artisans, and 
laborers constituted a grouping based not on class but on rank—social 
station. 
The relationship between Arthur Donnithorne and Adam Bede, in 
a novel set at the end of the eighteenth century, clearly exemplifies how 
Eliot regards rank as different from class. Arthur, the young squire-in-
waiting, embodies self-satisfied ease and moral indolence and entertains 
paternalistic fantasies about his future as a benevolent and beloved 
landlord. At the same time, Adam seems endlessly deferential to those of 
higher social rank such as Arthur, as this extended passage from chapter 
16 makes clear: 
Adam, I confess, was very susceptible to the influence of 
rank, and quite ready to give an extra amount of respect to 
every one who had more advantages than himself, not 
being a philosopher or a proletaire with democratic ideas, 
but simply a stout-limbed clever carpenter with a large fund 
of reverence in his nature, which inclined him to admit all 
established claims unless he saw very clear grounds for 
questioning them. He had no theories about setting the 




damage done by building with ill-seasoned timber—by 
ignorant men in fine clothes making plans for outhouses 
and workshops and the like without knowing the bearings 
of things—by slovenly joiners’ work, and by hasty contracts 
that could never be fulfilled without ruining somebody; and 
he resolved, for his part, to set his face against such doings. 
On these points he would have maintained his opinion 
against the largest landed proprietor in Loamshire or 
Stonyshire either; but he felt that beyond these it would be 
better for him to defer to people who were more knowing 
than himself. He saw as plainly as possible how ill the 
woods on the estate were managed, and the shameful state 
of the farm-buildings; and if old Squire Donnithorne had 
asked him the effect of this mismanagement, he would have 
spoken his opinion without flinching, but the impulse to a 
respectful demeanour towards a “gentleman” would have 
been strong within him all the while. The word 
“gentleman” had a spell for Adam, and, as he often said, he 
“couldn’t abide a fellow who thought he made himself fine 
by being coxy to’s betters.” I must remind you again that 
Adam had the blood of the peasant in his veins, and that 
since he was in his prime half a century ago, you must 
expect some of his characteristics to be obsolete. (AB, ch 16) 
Here, in Adam Bede, Eliot’s plot movements seem to propose an 
egalitarian ideal. Even though Adam remains “very susceptible to the 
influence of rank,” he declares himself Arthur’s equal at the moment of 
discovering his patron’s irresponsible behavior toward Hetty (ch 16, p 
139; ch 28, p 260). Similarly, though Adam would never put “worldly 
interest” before his sense of what is “honourable,” he begins as a foreman 
but ends up owning a flourishing building business (ch 43, p 394). In Silas 




respectability and wins, so that Godfrey Cass, the most substantially 
landed parishioner, must give up his claims to the daughter who has 
been adopted by Silas, a working man. Eliot generally shows in her 
fiction the curtailment of upper-class dominance to be far more a gain 
than a loss. 
However, ambiguities do arise. While the word “gentleman” holds 
Adam, “with the blood of the peasant in his veins,” in its thrall, Arthur 
harbors fantasies about the continuance of rank and its unearned 
privileges. He believes that, with “a prosperous, contented tenantry,” he 
will become 
the model of an English gentleman—mansion in first-rate 
order, all elegance and high taste—jolly housekeeping—
finest stud in Loamshire—purse open to all public objects—
in short, everything as different as possible from what was 
now associated with the name of Donnithorne. (AB, ch 12) 
Arthur is in for a rude shock, but not in the form of an uprising of his 
tenants. The Donnithorne estate, mismanaged by the family, preserves 
the idea of a harmonious system of social differences based on birth and 
property and held together by the magnanimity of the powerful and the 
acquiesence of the powerless: “a grateful and honest confiding 
dependence,” as Southey characterized it in 1829. Thus, Arthur and 
Adam, although they come to blows over Hetty, hold a mutual respect 




matter who occupies it, and in exchange Arthur respects Adam’s 
character, which functions as an ideal reflection of the integrity of the 
entire system. 
Neither Adam nor Arthur, nor anyone else in Eliot’s Midlands 
fictional world for that matter, thinks of himself as belonging to a class to 
which he also owes his identity and devotion. Instead, these characters 
identify themselves only by their positions on a vertical hierarchy (along 
which they have a limited degree of mobility, as Adam does, rising up 
the social scale through his efforts)—or, more commonly, a pyramidal 
hierarchy, with the great mass of so-called “common people” occupying 
the base. Perhaps Arthur thinks of his tenants as an undifferentiated mob, 
but he never thinks of them as a class. 
By the time Eliot wrote Adam Bede, however, the class system was 
long entrenched. Indeed, Adam’s social mobility displays all the 
characteristics of middle-class social ideology. Because the new economic 
divisions of land, capital, and labor—as opposed to hereditary 
entitlements and duties and title to landed property—determine class, 
class differs in fundamental ways from rank. Within the class system, 
one’s position within a particular class—and not within a fixed hierarchy 




introduces a notion of class interest and of a society based not on a 
preordained order but on inequality. 
Class-based hierarchy functions in Eliot’s fiction in a complicated 
fashion: interest groups, occupational groups, and sectional religious 
groups may overlap. Unlike rank, it takes for granted the existence of 
conflict and tension among classes, and it stratifies and sectionalizes 
society along lines openly recognized as unequal: working and housing 
conditions, food and leisure pursuits, types of illnesses and lengths of 
lifespans. Arthur, who “doesn’t mean badly by his tenants or any one 
else,” does not question the loyalty of his tenants, but his “way of paring 
and clipping at expenses” would certainly affect their livelihoods in a 
destructive way. Even so, it would not occur to Arthur that the tenants 
might organize themselves sufficiently to question their living conditions 
or make demands of their landlord. In a modest local community where 
the sustenance of all depends on the big house, where few can read or 
write, and where communication with other districts remains limited, 
such action would seem inconceivable. 
In other words, Eliot’s farm laborers remain, on the whole, 
unconscious of themselves as a class. However, as Raymond Williams 
observes, working-class consciousness began to form in Britain at about 




professionals, on the other hand—members of a social class—tended to 
live together in cities and interact among themselves, read the same 
newspapers, and frequent the same pubs. The relationship they 
experienced with other classes constituted not a personal relationship but 
a relationship based on economic transactions. Thomas Carlyle in 1829 
had already understood that the “sole nexus” between men in industrial 
societies was the “cash payment” nexus. Without sufficient economic or 
cultural capital, industrial operatives found themselves unable to 
improve their conditions or make demands of their social superiors, but 
their identities no longer hinged on their preordained place in the social 
order. 
Eliot’s fiction concerns itself with these thorny issues of 
hierarchy—class and rank—in unlikely and often unnoticed ways. Foe 
example, the world of fashion tropes the power of status, class, social 
rank, and wealth. Fashion intrudes into religious practices, displacing 
spirituality and Christian brotherhood. Already in “Janet’s Repentance,” 
Eliot shows the customs of churchgoing, of dressing well for church, and 
of mocking the unfashionably dressed as one and the same. “Few places 
could present a more brilliant show of out door toilettes than might be 
seen issuing from Milby church,” Eliot writes, but “the respect for the 




counterbalanced by considerable levity of behavior during the prayers 
and sermon,” especially toward “persons inferior in dress and 
demeanour” (SCL, 2, 254-255). 
The vocabulary of the Confirmation scene in “Janet’s Repentance” 
conveys well this ranking function of costuming and coiffure: 
The church-bells were ringing, and many families were 
conscious of Sunday sensations, chiefly referable to the fact 
that the daughters had come down to breakfast in their best 
frocks, and with their hair particularly well dressed. (SCL, 
ch 5) 
The scene reveals “Sunday sensations” to be so “chiefly referable” to 
wearing one’s “best frocks” and having “hair particularly well dressed” 
that even the Bishop becomes measured by the costume he wears. 
“Sensations” of this sort Eliot uncovers to be entirely hierarchical, not 
only for the values they privilege but also for their total neglect of the 
“working-day look” of those who labor in the fields and at the 
handlooms (5, 286). 
Noting that “it was not Sunday, but Wednesday,” Eliot expands 
her narrative to embrace the intra-familial costuming of “young ladies,” 
costuming that reflects only the “notion of its being Sunday”: 
The notion of its being Sunday was the strongest in young 
ladies like Miss Phipps, who was going to accompany her 
younger sister to the confirmation, and to wear a ‘sweetly 
pretty’ transparent bonnet with marabout feathers on the 




simplicity of her sister’s attire, who was, of course, to 
appear in a new white frock. (SCL, ch 5) 
This description of the sisters’ dress choice being mandated by a 
“notion” highlights Eliot’s particular view of society—the concentrated 
center of life and self-definition—as an arbitrary construct in thrall to the 
requirements of the moment. In this Confirmation scene, Eliot writes a 
setting where clothing, goods, and reputation state one’s identity, where 
the power of fashion converts Wednesday to Sunday, or, to put it a 
different way, where the notions of appearance shunt aside the 
organizing structure of the Gregorian calendar. 9 
Devoting an entire chapter to “Charity in Full-Dress,” George Eliot 
in The Mill on the Floss again turns a church activity into that blatant 
presentation of rank, a fashion show, and exposes how far removed from 
true charity it is. That fashion functions in a far more powerful way than 
charity becomes later punctuated by Eliot’s use of the metaphor that 
describes the stern-but-charitable Dr Kenn’s failed efforts to elicit from 
his parishioners kindness toward Maggie. “He suddenly found himself as 
                                                
9 Eighteenth- and nineteenth-century British thinkers and writers held a view of costume 
and fashion markedly different from that insinuated here by Eliot. John Ruskin, for 
example, in The True and the Beautiful in Art, Morals, and Religion (1858), observes that 
“True nobleness in dress is to be an important means of education. No good historical 
painting ever yet existed or ever can exist, where the dress of the people of the time are 
not beautiful.” Scottish philosopher and essayist Thomas Carlyle holds that “If the cut of 
the costume indicates intellect and talent, then the color indicates temper and heart.” 
Finally, novelist and dramatist Henry Fielding maintains that “Fashion is the science of 




powerless,” Eliot writes, “as he was aware he would have been if he had 
attempted to influence the shape of bonnets” (57, 441). 
Eliot deploys costume as an hierarchical indicator in order to 
reveal, within the purely secular sphere of kinship, the perversion of 
custom. In The Mill on the Floss, for instance, rituals of dress reveal both 
the paganism that unifies the Dodson kin and the economic rivalry that 
inspires their reverence for “whatever was customary and respectable” 
(30, 239). 
The novel introduces and differentiates each of the Dodson sisters 
by her way of dressing; and rivalries reflected in modes of dress mark 
each of the ceremonial family gatherings. Sister Pullet, who “had married 
a gentleman farmer, and had leisure and money to carry her crying and 
everything else to the highest pitch of respectability,” appears at the first 
gathering wearing a costume matched in extravagance only by her tears 
(7, 53). Mocking both, the narrator links them to the gross debasement of 
custom and displacement of emotion in a putatively civilized society:  
It is a pathetic sight and a striking example of the 
complexity introduced into the emotions by a high state of 
civilization—the sight of a fashionably dressed female in 
grief. From the sorrow of a Hottentot to that of a woman in 
large buckram sleeves, with several bracelets on each arm, 
an architectural bonnet, and delicate ribbon strings—what a 
long series of gradations! In the enlightened child of 
civilization the abandonment characteristic of grief is 




Weeping for the death of an acquaintance, Mrs Pullet wears her 
grief as she wears her bonnet—for adornment—and as the passage 
evolves she begins to prepare her ornaments for a return to “a calm and 
healthy state.” In contrast, the genuine emotions that  emerge during this 
family gathering seem quarrelsome from beginning to end, whether the 
subject be Tom’s education, Maggie’s hair, funerals, millinery, or money. 
The overriding importance of the last, moreover, turns the feast into a 
disastrous feud.  
Even when the metamorphosis of custom into costume seems 
relatively innocent, an inversion of value marks it as suspicious. In 
another chapter of The Mill on the Floss, for instance, a “procession” leads 
merely to a shrouded “best room” where an expensive new bonnet that is 
the pride of one sister and the envy of the other becomes unveiled with 
“funereal solemnity” (ch 9, 80-81). At the opposite extreme sits the shabby 
“costume” (“selected with the high moral purpose of instilling perfect 
humility into Bessy and her children”) Sister Glegg puts on for the family 
council (ch 23, 183). At this meeting, the refusal of aid to the bankrupt 
Tullivers becomes so absolute as to suggest to Maggie “a world where 
people behaved the best to those they did not pretend to love, and that 
did not belong to them” (ch 25, 208). The novel reveals, furthermore, how 




“any effect with her person.” “Girls are so accustomed,” the narrator 
explains, “to think of dress as the main ground of vanity” (ch 33, 263). At 
the same time, the narrative strategy of moving from Maggie to “girls” 
renders costume, however clannish or idiosyncratic in its particulars, 
emblematic of a great divide between custom as a great social force and 
custom as a force of social goodness. 
In terms of hierarchy, a great deal more than costume defines the 
good society, of course. The definition has to do with manners as well, 
but as George Eliot regularly dramatizes, fashion dictates manners, 
because the “good society” shows them off in order to indicate its 
refinement. Maggie’s manners and dress, for instance, not only mirror her 
“tender and affectionate” nature but also serve as foil to the “artificial 
airs,” “pretentious etiquette,” and “petty contrivances other women 
have”—especially women wanting to assert their positions in “good 
society.” 
This ranking of manners and fashion—nowhere more apparent 
than in the demarcation of “good society” and “fashionable society”—




corruption and to sanction unconventional behavior.10 Sometimes the 
identity functions metaphorically, as in the rejection of fashion that 
accompanies Felix’s avowal of loyalty to the working class, or in the 
allusions to “costume and horsemanship” and “high door-step and a 
brass knocker” that convey Felix’s contempt for “clerkly gentility” (FH, 
ch 5, 144-145; ch 11, 219). 
In addition, here and elsewhere, whether through scene or image, 
all the accouterments of “good society” testify in George Eliot’s fiction to 
fashion’s invasive power and to a corresponding conventionalization of 
custom. “Marriage,” in Middlemarch, “according to custom,” depends 
most of all on “good looks, vanity, and merely canine affection”; and 
“genteel visiting” on “suitable furniture and complete dinner-service,” 
not “esteem” (MM, ch 1, 6-7; ch 23, 170). The novel’s opening pages 
quickly transition from the external dress to the internal reasons for 
choosing the costume, from the clothing to the motives controlling and 
coloring it. It was “only to close observers that Celia’s dress differed from 
her sister’s,” and had “a shade of coquetry in its arrangements.” 
                                                
10 In her essay, “George Eliot and Politics” in The Cambridge Companion to George Eliot 
(2006), Nancy Henry asserts that Eliot in effect concocted a deliberate strategic plan with 
respect to the sequence of her novel writing. Unlike other critics, Henry traces in a 
convincing way what she sees as Eliot’s purposeful development toward a 
predetermined goal, a movement from the earlier novels—largely grounded in a realist 
aesthetic that was underpinned by Eliot’s studies of provincial life—to an established 
position from which Eliot would embark on the work, Henry argues, Eliot long sought 





Dorothea’s “plain dressing was due to mixed conditions, in most of 
which her sister shared.” They both fall under a certain influence, “the 
pride of being ladies,” of belonging to a rank not exactly aristocratic, but 
unquestionably “good.” The quotation marks placed around the word 
“good” become suggestive and meaningful. 
Eliot goes to great lengths to clarify issues of familial ranking. 
There exist “no parcel-tying forefathers” in the Brooke pedigree. Mixing 
issues of inherited rank and fashion, Eliot describes a Puritan forefather, 
“who served under Cromwell, but afterward conformed and managed to 
come out of all . . . political troubles as the proprietor of a respectable 
family estate,” had a hand in Dorothea’s “plain” wardrobe. “She could 
not reconcile the anxieties of a spiritual life involving eternal 
consequences with a keen interest in gimp and artificial protrusions of 
drapery,” but Celia “had that common-sense which is able to accept 
momentous doctrines without any eccentric agitation.” Both function as 
examples of “reversion.” Then, as an instance of heredity working itself 
out in character, “in Mr. Brooke, the hereditary strain of Puritan energy 
was clearly in abeyance, but in his niece Dorothea it glowed alike through 
faults and virtues.” 
Within Eliot’s work, fashion equates to hierarchy but also to 




George Eliot dramatizes a good many of these phases, ranging from the 
relatively innocent to the sophisticatedly corrupt and renders them 
symptomatic of the dissolution of custom. In the first and most 
transitional of her novels, she rails against “all the artificial vesture of our 
life” (MF, ch 58, 453). In the last and most contemporary of her novels, 
she makes the world of “highest fashion,” complete with “bedizened 
child” (DD, ch 1, 35-36), entirely one with the gambler’s world depicted 
throughout Daniel Deronda.! 
In that novel, the spirited Gwendolen attempts from the start to 
invert the prevailing hierarchical arrangement by marrying a man she 
believes she can command. Grandcourt performs so cunningly as the 
master that he courts her by encouraging the deception. Whether 
Gwendolen relishes her power of using him as she likes, or whether he in 
fact uses her as he likes, the delineation of the “depraving agency” seems 
sharp and clear, evident even in their proposal scene:  
At that moment his strongest wish was to be completely 
master of this creature—this piquant combination of 
maidenliness and mischief: that she knew things which had 
made her start away from him, spurred him to triumph 
over that repugnance; and he was believing that he should 
triumph. And she—ah, piteous equality in the need to 
dominate!—she was overcome . . . by the suffused sense 
that here in this man’s homage to her lay the rescue from 




Instead of rescue, instead of embodying Feuerbach’s I-Thou ideal, 
the marriage brings an oppression so severe as to make Grandcourt’s 
daily pleasure Gwendolen’s torture. In this depraved structure, 
Grandcourt holds sway over Gwendolen while bestowing on her a rank 
she can attain only by aligning herself with one who dominates her. The 
rector, invoking the vocabulary of “power . . . rank and wealth,” carefully 
outlines to Gwendolen what he considers to be the practical benefits of 
the marriage: 
Marriage is the only true and satisfactory sphere of a 
woman, and if your marriage with Mr. Grandcourt should 
be happily decided upon, you will have, probably, an 
increasing power, both of rank and wealth, which may be 
used for the benefit of others. (DD, ch 13) 
The form of Grandcourt’s power casts this husband as the worst 
kind of potentate. Just as Mill’s The Subjection of Women compares the lot 
of a wife to that of a “Sultan’s favourite slave,” so George Eliot alludes 
sardonically to a “Moslem paradise” when she writes of Gwendolen’s 
imprisonment on her husband’s yacht. 
Both participants acknowledge the contractual nature of their 
marriage. “She had no right to complain of her contract, or to with draw 
from it,” Gwendolen feels, “by saying that there had been a tacit part of 
the contract on her side—namely, that she meant to rule and have her 




obligation by conveying to Gwendolen what Eliot describes as certain 
“rank and luxuries.” The narrator carefully explains: 
Grandcourt might have pleaded that he was perfectly 
justified in taking care that his wife should fulfill the 
obligations she had accepted. Her marriage was a contract 
where all the ostensible advantages were on her side, and it 
was only of those advantages that her husband should use 
his power to hinder her from any injurious self committal or 
unsuitable behavior. He knew quite well that she had not 
married him—had not overcome her repugnance to certain 
facts—out of love to him personally; he had won her by the 
rank and luxuries he had to give her, and these she had got: 
he had fulfilled his side of the contract. (DD, ch 54) 
Grandcourt now threatens to deprive her of these “rank and 
luxuries” by changing the terms of his will, naming as his heir the boy he 
had by Mrs Glasher should Gwendolen not bear him a son. His threat to 
withhold those privileges of hierarchy owed to Gwendolen by marriage 
suddenly becomes acutely clear to her: “This question of property and 
inheritance was meant as a finish to her humiliations and her thraldom.” 
George Eliot makes Grandcourt’s moral obtuseness—his inability 
to understand that Gwendolen’s repugnance consists partly of spiritual 
dread—the cause of his own defeat by showing how his calculations 
about the will have “an effect the very opposite of what he intended” (VI, 
48, 664). While Grandcourt would employ the will to maintain his 
dominance, to keep his “yoke tightly riveted” on Gwendolen’s neck, 




Grandcourt attempts to increase Gwendolen’s thraldom by revising his 
will; Gwendolen sees in the new arrangement a way of righting the 
wrong done to Mrs Glasher. Earlier she asked Deronda how she might 
make amends. Grandcourt unwittingly provides her with a way of acting 
on the advice Deronda gives her:  
That is the bitterest of all—to wear the yoke of our own 
wrong doing. But if you submitted to that, as men submit to 
maiming or a lifelong incurable disease?—and made the 
unalterable wrong a reason for more effort towards a good 
that may do something to counterbalance the evil? (DD, V, 
36, 506) 
The advice raises questions even as it answers them, as does the 
later movement of the novel. The closing affirms Gwendolen’s “good,” 
but only tentatively, by projecting a future announced but unseen.  
Although Daniel Deronda contains energetic criticism of social 
ranking and institutions, persistent atrophy and dissolution mark the 
English segments. Gwendolen enters the novel with a “dynamic glance”; 
she leaves with a “withered look of grief.” The word “dynamic,” George 
Eliot would have been acutely aware, means “force producing motion.” 
Within the actual social world of this novel that force alters hierarchical 
arrangements in either a destructive or inert way, as in Gwendolen’s 
seeking to “conquer” or her suffering “arrest.” An opening image—so 




Daniel Deronda. Invoking “human equality” while commenting on the 
“varieties of European type” gathered at the gambling hall, “Livonian 
and Spanish, Graeco-Italian and miscellaneous German, English 
aristocratic and English plebeian,” George Eliot writes:  
Here certainly was a striking admission of human equality. 
The white bejewelled fingers of an English countess were 
very near touching a bony, yellow, crab-like hand stretching 
a bared wrist to clutch a heap of coin—a hand easy to sort 
with the square, gaunt face, deepset eyes, grizzled 
eyebrows, and ill-combed scanty hair which seemed a slight 
metamorphosis of the vulture. (DD, I, 1, 36)! 
In her essay, “The Natural History of German Life” (1856), Eliot 
writes explicitly that she embraces a different means of analyzing the 
hierarchical rankings of “the people,” “the masses,” “the proletariat,” and 
“the peasantry.” Rejecting both economic generalizations and romantic 
idealization, she calls for a “natural history” of the working classes, 
revealing their “real characteristics” to those outside their social ranks 
(Essays 268). In George Eliot’s critical work and the fiction that followed 
it, collective abstractions such as class and rank seem complicated, even 
deceptive and limiting. Her narrative interest in the mode of natural 
history, as opposed to abstract generalizations, leads to representations of 
the interplay between character, heredity, and environment. She replaces 
diagrammatic classifications by rank with pictures of individual 




(1857), George Eliot’s earliest study of this sort, she depicts Barton as a 
lower-middle-class man displaced from his proper hierarchical station. 
“Nature” has given him a strong opinion of himself as a preacher, but he 
would have been better to remain at the hereditary rank of his father, as 
an “excellent cabinetmaker and deacon of an Independent church,” 
where faulty English and constant sniffing would not have prevented 
him being “a shining light in the Dissenting circle of Bridgeport” (SCL, ch 
2). In what seems at first a clear statement of social conservatism, against 
the upward mobility of the lower orders, Eliot depicts Barton as a misfit, 
a country clergyman, a “tallow dip … plebeian, dim, and ineffectual” 
taken from the kitchen where it belongs and stuck in a silver candlestick 
in the drawing room. The pathos and comedy of Barton’s narrative 
emanates in great part from the fact that he does not apprehend this 
social displacement: he seems entirely unconscious of the way in which 
his rank registers transparently to his peers and the parishioners of rural 
Shepperton. 
Yet to label George Eliot as a social conservative opposed to social 
mobility would be to miss the emphasis on exceptionalism evident in her 
early fiction; the way in which “Nature” distributes gifts unevenly, 
endowing some with talents that make them stand out from the social 




standing. The sad fortunes of Amos Barton emanate from the fact that 
Nature has not bestowed upon him quite enough of a gift to rise free 
from his hereditary rank, unlike, for example, Adam Bede: 
He was not an average man. Yet such men as he are reared 
here and there in every generation of our peasant artisans—
with an inheritance of affections nurtured by a simple 
family life of common need and common industry, and an 
inheritance of faculties trained in skillful courageous labour: 
they make their way upward, rarely as geniuses, most 
commonly as painstaking honest men. (AB, ch 19) 
A careful scrutiny of the natural history of any rural 
neighborhood, the narrator implies, will throw up such exceptions, 
growing out of the peasant environment to rise beyond it and enrich a 
whole community; these individuals cannot be held over time to a fixed 
rank. 
Society, in George Eliot’s fiction and social analysis, never remains 
static but exists in a constant process of change, in which some slip “a 
little downward, some [get] higher footing” (MM, ch 11). Staying loyal to 
Feuerbach’s I-Thou formulation, Eliot depicts such change as an organic 
process in which different social groups function interdependently, not in 
conflict and opposition, despite the hitches and tension as misfitting 
individuals struggle to find their places. Adam Bede, for instance, makes 
his employers richer, but the novel represents him as a free agent and 




the old squire tries to pay Adam only a guinea for a commission Adam 
priced at one pound thirteen shillings, Adam refuses the exchange and 
gives the screen in question as a gift to the squire’s daughter rather than 
take less than his “regular price” (AB, ch 21). It might seem only a minor 
incident in the novel, but it speaks volumes about Eliot’s representations 
of social and economic ranking in the nineteenth century. 
Eliot contended with a solemn distinction made by many 
Victorians between poetry and fiction. The everyday prosaic worlds 
depicted in novels—so held some Victorians, Matthew Arnold among 
them—preclude that lofty ennobling of emotion characteristic of poetry 
and essential to art that seeks to affirm the social enterprise as a spiritual 
whole.11 Conversely, and crucially for Eliot, Feuerbach argues that 
the profoundest secrets lie in common everyday things. . . . 
It needs only that the ordinary course of things be 
interrupted in order to vindicate to common things an 
uncommon significance, to life, as such, a religious import. 
(276-278) 
                                                
11 In his article, “Matthew Arnold and the Novel,” published in Salmagundi (Fall 2001), 
Christopher Ricks examines more completely the denigration of the novel by Arnold 
and others. Ricks observes that “the novel did not command the high ground of 
criticism. The novel was patronized, condescended to, feared, misrepresented, and 
identified with its trashiest instances. . . . The novelist, from Jane Austen to Henry James, 
found herself or himself the beneficiary of such high-minded hauteur only when this 
phenomenon could itself be turned to artistic advantage in rueful comedy. It is within 
the world of D.H. Lawrence, not that of Arnold, that the novel is the bright book of life, 
and even in Lawrence’s day the announcement or pronouncement was called for. 
Arnold’s injustice to the novel is an instance of his concurring with, not resisting, the 




George Eliot committed to both: to being truthful to the experience 
of the working-day world and to revealing the poetry in the 
commonplace. Thus, for her, the sought-after “community of feeling” 
was to be created not only through the ennobling of experience, implicit 
in the argument Wordsworth makes in the Preface to the Lyrical Ballads, 
but also through the accurate portrayal of prosaic ordinariness. Together, 
Eliot believed, these elements would act together, enlarging the reader’s 
capacity to enter sympathetically into the human emotions, needs, 
experiences, and aspirations all people share. 
In chapter 54 of Middlemarch, the narrator remarks that “life would 
be no better than candlelight tinsel and daylight rubbish if our spirits 
were not touched by what has been, to issues of longing and constancy” 
(MM, 54, 393). Expressing a dissatisfaction with what “is,” figures such as 
these appear with great frequency in George Eliot’s fiction. Linking the 
deceptively attractive and the seemingly worthless, they reveal the poetic 
“candlelight tinsel” to be no less tied to daily reality than is the entirely 
prosaic “daylight rubbish.” Although Eliot in Romola makes an 
accommodation of sorts as the “the glow of a common life with the lost 
multitude . . . beholds the history of the world as the history of a great 
redemption” and touches the “common deeds of a dusty life,” that glow 




Trying to steady it so as to offset the feelings of despair or 
resignation she herself harbors toward both the speciously poetic and the 
utterly prosaic, George Eliot often enlists the diction of deliverance, for 
she finds herself preoccupied both by the elaborate set of associations she 
brings to “this working-day world” and by a pronounced desire to 
escape. 
Eliot derives this diction of deliverance from Feuerbach’s idea as 
expressed in The Essence of Christianity that human beings must learn, by 
escaping their egos, by recognizing a world outside of themselves, to seek 
and find their own deliverances: 
That which comes from God to man, comes to man only 
from man in God, that is, only from the ideal nature of man 
to the phenomenal man, from the species to the 
individual.... The contents of the divine revelation are of 
human origin, for they have proceeded not from God as 
God, but from God as determined by human reason, human 
wants, that is, directly from human reason and human 
wants. And so in revelation man goes out of himself, in 
order, by a circuitous path, to return to himself! (TEOC, 207) 
Eliot wholeheartedly embraces Feuerbach’s admonition that 
humans take responsibility for the power of their emotions, to “return to 
[themselves]” and, by understanding that “man is God to man,” deliver 
themselves in a moral sense. At the same time, however, Eliot associates 




the feeling of a want; therefore conscious, or an unconscious 
need, that is God. Thus the disconsolate feeling of a void, of 
loneliness, needed a God in whom there is society, a union 
of beings fervently loving each other. (73) 
These feelings of despair or resignation parallel feelings Eliot 
herself harbors toward both the poetic and the prosaic. Indeed, the 
elaborate diction of deliverance that Eliot brings to the “working-day 
world” betrays a desire to escape “the feeling of a want” that haunted 
Eliot’s imagination. 
Eliot’s letters clearly reveal her shrinking “from decided 
‘deliverances’ on momentous subjects from the dread of coming to swear 
by my own ‘deliverances,’ and sinking into an insistent echo of myself”; 
yet, writing to an admirer, she references “the intense comfort I have 
found in the response which your mind has given to every ‘deliverance’ 
of mine” (GEL, 5: 76, 325). But Eliot seems completely comfortable with 
neither. Eliot’s unease emerges in the inflated language she brings to the 
instantaneous and consequently unconvincing recognitions of union in 
her fiction—as between Maggie and Dr Kenn, Romola and Savonarola, 
Lydgate and Dorothea, Daniel and Mirah, Daniel and Mordecai. 
Occasionally, Eliot’s overall dramatic action renders such unions ironic, 
disclosing them to be calculated inversions of the Feurerbach I-Thou 
formulation and therefore powerless to affect everyday reality, as in 




times, the events confirm and highlight a deliverance by countering the 
negations that would otherwise play themselves out. As a 
straightforward example, Deronda delivers Mirah from death, and she 
then becomes so emblematic of the community of humankind that “a 
painter,” Eliot informs the reader, “need have changed nothing” had he 
wanted to put her face “in front of the host singing ‘peace on earth and 
goodwill to men’” (DD 32, 418).  
In Felix Holt, the Radical, although Esther’s love for Felix delivers 
her, Eliot casts Esther a deliverer as well: Esther affects her audience 
during her testimony at Felix’s trial much as George Eliot seeks to affect 
her reader. Eliot’s turning away from the pending rescue of a character, 
as in the final scenes involving Deronda and Gwendolen, highlight the 
complexities of her technique. 
Eliot writes deliverances large and small, her diction often 
bestowing psychological heft to otherwise insignificant actions, as in this 
passage from Felix Holt: 
Esther noticed a strange fitfulness in her movements. 
Sometimes the stitches of her embroidery went on with 
silent unbroken swiftness for a quarter of an hour, as if she 
had to work out her deliverance from bondage by finishing 
a scroll-patterned border. (FH, ch 45) 
Chapter 24 contains another instance of Eliot’s making a putatively 




agitation had increased so much during his walk, that the passing coach 
had been a means of deliverance not to be resisted; and, literally at the 
eleventh hour, he had hailed and mounted the cheerful Tally-ho! and 
carried away his portion of the debate in his pocket” (FH, ch 24). An 
additional example appears in chapter 42 of Romola, where Eliot writes 
that for 
a century and a half there were records how the Florentines, 
suffering from drought, or flood, or famine, or pestilence, or 
the threat of wars, had fetched the potent image within their 
walls, and had found deliverance. 
And Romola’s chapter 48 provides a moment when Eliot wields the 
diction of deliverance to have one character issue a warning to another. 
Tito, “in a cool liquid tone” that betrays a “husband’s determination to 
mastery,” defies Feuerbach’s I-Thou equilibrium as he instructs Romola 
that “it is time we understand each other.” By “understand,” Tito means 
of course that Romola must bow to his desire to steer clear of his practical 
doings. Romola counters: “You shut me out from your mind. You affect 
to think of me as a being too unreasonable to share in the knowledge of 
your affairs. You will be open with me about nothing.” Thereupon, Tito, 
invoking “deliverance,” upbraids Romola: 
“You would perhaps flatter yourself,” [Tito] went on, “that 
you were performing a heroic deed of deliverance; you 
might as well try to turn locks with fine words as apply 




not whether you can have any belief in me, but whether, 
now you have been warned, you will dare to rush, like a 
blind man with a torch in his hand, amongst intricate affairs 
of which you know nothing.” 
Occasionally, Eliot has a narrator employ the language of 
deliverance while openly espousing Feuerbach’s ideas, as in this 
description of Daniel Deronda’s empathetic abilities in the appropriately 
titled chapter 16, “Revelations”: 
Our consciences are not all of the same pattern, an inner 
deliverance of fixed laws they are the voice of sensibilities 
as various as our memories (which also have their kinship 
and likeness). And Deronda’s conscience included 
sensibilities beyond the common, enlarged by his early 
habit of thinking himself imaginatively into the experience 
of others. (DD, bk 6, ch 16). 
The deliverances of Esther and Gwendolen, on the other hand, 
constitute part of a long and intricate process, beginning with their 
entrancement within a specious candlelight world, continuing 
throughout the daylight disenchantments they later experience, and 
culminating finally in perhaps questionable reconciliations. Each step in 
this process of entrancement, disenchantment, and deliverance involves 
in some way Eliot’s inscription of Feuerbach’s communitarian ideas. 
The entrancement with being a “lady” that holds Esther and 
Gwendolen tightly under its spell serves to measure the absence of value 




“middling” than the ordinary world but a good deal more hypocritical; 
its “niceties” simply mask the vulgarities they pretend to eliminate. 
Lyon’s cluttered study, the Holborn book shop, and the small house at 
Chelsea where the poor but cultured Meyricks live become the loci of 
intellectual engagement, while the drawing room and country estate, 
along with all the other scenery associated with “genteel romance,” the 
novel shows to be imprisoning, holding one “captive by the ordinary 
wirework of social forms” (DD 6, 83). That Esther fails to perceive for so 
long just how ordinary they are reveals only her relatively innocent 
retreat from reality. 
Gwendolen’s attitudes seem more complicated, since she regularly 
mocks conventional social forms and yet cannot muster an awareness 
sufficient to deliver herself from them. Eliot’s language demands 
deliverance from illusion even as it unequivocally constrains: Esther’s 
“imaginary mansion” collapses, and Gwendolen’s conservatory life 
becomes a “penitentiary,” her large drawing room no better than a 
“painted gilded prison.” 
The disenchantment of Esther exists in an essentially vicarious 
way, experienced through Mrs Transome, whose “life had been like a 
spoiled shabby pleasure-day, in which the music and the processions are 




who may also, like Esther, be delivered out of a spoiled shabbiness “to 
lead a life of ‘vision and of choice.’” Gwendolen’s own reflection in the 
mirror, which reminds her of “the packed-up shows of a departing fair” 
(DD 23, 306) triggers her disenchantment. Fitfully longing for 
“deliverance from the dull insignificance of her girlhood” and the 
potential of her forthcoming marriage to Grandcourt to provide it, 
Gwendolen seems painfully skeptical about the hoped-for “freedom” and 
her “irrevocable decision”: 
The brilliant position she had longed for, the imagined 
freedom she would create for herself in marriage, the 
deliverance from the dull insignificance of her girlhood—all 
immediately before her; and yet they had come to her 
hunger like food with the taint of sacrilege upon it, which 
she must snatch with terror. In the darkness and loneliness 
of her little bed, her more resistant self could not act against 
the first onslaught of dread after her irrevocable decision. 
(DD, bk 4, ch 28) 
Through the language of disillusionment, George Eliot, in a 
fashion Feuerbach would approve, uncovers a consuming selfishness in 
the false values of a make-believe world that desecrates the everyday one 
while pretending to ignore or look down on it. In addition, as Barbara 
Hardy points out, while the scenes of disenchantment suggest a “prosaic 
present stretching into an unchanging prosaic future . . . each conversion 
of poetry into prose depends on the dispelling of a dream. . . . It is a test 




When a form of deliverance replaces the dream that has been 
dispelled, however, the prose again becomes poetry. Eliot designs the 
final conversion to function as a healing force, but unresolved tensions 
continue to surface. The poetry Esther had thought to find in Harold 
Transome turns unambiguously into prose; but the poetry she discovers 
in Felix, though it allegedly returns her to “that rougher, commoner 
world where her home had been,” merely substitutes one romantic 
notion for another (FH 43, 526). Felix “is my champagne,” Esther declares, 
as Eliot’s language of deliverance pushes her “towards the life where the 
draughts of joy sprang from the unchanging fountains of reverence and 
devout love” (FH 43, 539; 50, 597). All signs of her former “sauciness” 
disappear; “devotion,” “perfect love,” “inspiration,” “consecration,” and 
“ecstasy” take their place (ch 43, 547-551). 
The settings of the love scenes as well contribute to the deliverance 
from the everyday, since most of them occur in a Sunday, countryside 
world. In these ways and others, Esther becomes the “ballad heroine” we 
are supposed to believe she refuses to be. Still, she exists as a ballad 
heroine with a difference—delivered not into but from riches to marry 
the man she loves. Furthermore, at the trial held after the Election Day 
riots, her testimony sets Felix free by transforming the disagreement and 




In several ways, this act constitutes something of a model for the 
kind of deliverance George Eliot hopes to provide for her readers. 
Esther’s testimony emanates from the “inward revolution” she has 
experienced (49, 591). Her effect on her listeners depends on the same 
kind of “ardour which has flashed out and illuminated all poetry and 
history” (46, 571). Creating in others a corresponding “state of 
sympathetic ardour,” the impression she makes on their feeling dispels 
what had been “unmitigated daylight.” 
But while Esther affects the jury as George Eliot wishes to affect 
her audience, the overturning of the verdict nonetheless circumvents the 
task commonly ascribed to witness and realistic novelist alike. For 
Esther’s power, derived from her “inspired ignorance” and 
“incongruously simple” testimony, speaks only in the most minimal way 
to the daylight realities presented throughout the novel (46, 571).  
As though further acknowledging the incongruities in Felix Holt, 
George Eliot seems in Middlemarch to mock the earlier book, when she 
writes of Lydgate that 
he was beginning now to imagine how two creatures who 
loved each other, and had a stock of thoughts in common, 
might laugh over their shabby furniture, and their 
calculations how far they could afford butter and eggs. But 
the glimpse of that poetry seemed as far off from him as the 




Eliot denies to Lydgate the reconciliations allowed to Romola and 
Esther. Returning in Gwendolen to a character similar to Esther, but far 
more complicated, George Eliot both offers and denies her deliverance. 
Gwendolen’s urgent need for deliverance from Grandcourt becomes so 
pronounced that the word appears again and again, three times in one 
particular sentence alone:  
The thought that his death was the only possible 
deliverance for her was one with the thought that 
deliverance would never come—the double deliverance 
from the injury with which other beings might reproach her 
and from the yoke she had brought on her own neck. (R 48, 
669)  
But while Gwendolen continues to wear that yoke after 
Grandcourt’s death and must learn to find her own deliverance by 
recognizing a world outside of herself, still George Eliot attempts once 
again to affirm Feuerbach’s idea of the “way our brother may be in the 
stead of God to us” (64, 833). 
The stressfulness of Eliot’s task makes itself felt in the jagged and 
unevenly controlled rhythms of the scenes between Deronda and 
Gwendolen as the novel approaches its close. Repeatedly withdrawing 
from the deliverance he offers to Gwendolen in the two chapters 




own Jewish lineage, Deronda finds himself caught between all-absorbing 
sympathy for Gwendolen and rapt attention to his new life’s task. 
In the rallying call that brings The Essence of Christianity to a close, 
Feuerbach urges the reader to understand that “the profoundest secrets 
lie in common everyday things” (276-278) and issues the declaration that 
“only community constitutes humanity.” Eliot answers Feuerbach’s call 
by attempting in her fiction to fuse profundity and “everyday things.” 
Eliot makes this attempt in one conspicuous instance by referencing 
Dante—who, importantly for Eliot, wrote the Divine Comedy not in “high” 
Latin but in an “everyday” Tuscan dialect—and his fictive treatment of 
deliverance. 
Eliot’s notebooks, letters, and essays for the Westminster Review 
indicate great knowledge of a remarkable number of European authors, 
including Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Dante, Auguste Comte, George Sand, 
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Gottfried Ephraim Lessing, and Heinrich 
Heine. For Eliot, Dante becomes the one writer who most nearly realizes 
Feuerbach’s fusion. In Impressions of Theophrastus Such, Eliot advises the 
reader to “witness Dante, who is at once the most precise and homely in 
his reproduction of actual objects, and the most soaringly at large in his 




Theophrastus Such, canto 15 of the Divine Comedy in order to assert in a 
corrective, Feuerbachian fashion that 
powerful imagination is not false outward vision, but 
intense inward representation, and a creative energy 
constantly fed by susceptibility to the veriest minutiae of 
experience, which it reproduces and constructs in fresh and 
fresh wholes; not the habitual confusion of provable fact 
with the fictions of fancy and transient inclination, but a 
breadth of ideal association. 
Eliot considers Dante 
the strongest seer who can support the stress of creative 
energy and yet keep that sanity of expectation which 
consists in distinguishing . . . between the cose che son vere 
outside the individual mind, and the non falsi errori which 
are the revelations of true imaginative power. 
Interestingly, at the point in Daniel Deronda where Gwendolen 
appears to be in her lowest spirits, Eliot draws an explicit comparison 
between Gwendolen’s pending deliverance and that of Dante’s La Pia, 
who appears very briefly in the Comedy. A convincing case can be made 
that Eliot designs chapter 54 of Daniel Deronda—with its deliberate 
linking of Gwendolen with “the poor Tuscan lady who had her 
deliverance long ago”—as an imaginative expansion on the scanty details 
in Dante’s original. Eliot writes that 
Madoima Pia, whose husband, feeling himself injured by 
her, took her to his castle amid the swampy flats of the 
Maremma and got rid of her there, makes a pathetic figure 




the last and desire to be remembered compassionately by 
their fellow-countrymen. We know little about the grounds 
of mutual discontent between the Siennese couple, but we 
may infer with some confidence that the husband had never 
been a very delightful companion, and that on the flats of 
the Maremma his disagreeable manners had a background 
which threw them out remarkably; whence in his desire to 
punish his wife to the uttermost, the nature of things was so 
far against him that in relieving himself of her he could not 
avoid making the relief mutual. And thus, without any 
hardness to the poor Tuscan lady who had her deliverance 
long ago, one may feel warranted in thinking of her with a 
less sympathetic interest than of the better known 
Gwendolen who . . . is at the very height of her 
entanglement in those fated meshes which are woven 
within more closely than without. . . . (731-732)  
Clearly, Eliot offers Dante’s “poor Tuscan lady” as the more obscure 
bearer of the suffering that Gwendolen herself ungoes. 
Until Eliot reveals the form of Gwendolen’s “deliverance”—the 
husband dies instead of the wife—the audience waits in suspense to 
discover the importance of the Madonna Pia section, given Gwendolen’s 
murderous desires regarding Grandcourt. However, the reference 
accurately predicts the onset of Gwendolen’s purgatorial existence. Eliot, 
recalling Feuerbach’s instruction “to vindicate to common things an 
uncommon significance,” expresses both the scale and the costs of 
Gwendolen’s actions with a lucidity that echoes Gwendolen’s state of 
mind at the epiphanic moment: “She had a root of conscience in her, and 




that she had been wrong” (733). Gwendolen repents at last and thereupon 








“All this was told at once”: 
Reader Engagement and Eliot’s Sympathetic Vision 
After all, one may hear the most private affairs of other 
people, but only in a spirit of respect for the struggling, 
battered thing which any human soul is, and in a spirit of 
fine, discriminative sympathy. For even satire is a form of 
sympathy. It is the way our sympathy flows and recoils that 
really determines our lives. And here lies the vast 
importance of the novel, properly handled. It can inform 
and lead into new places the flow of our sympathetic 
consciousness, and it can lead our sympathy away in recoil 
from things gone dead. Therefore, the novel, properly 
handled, can reveal the most secret places of life: for it is in 
the passional secret places of life, above all, that the tide of 
sensitive awareness needs to ebb and flow, cleansing and 
freshening. 
– D.H. Lawrence, Lady Chatterley’s Lover 
Lawrence’s twentieth-century meditation on sympathy restates 
George Eliot’s guiding principle of novel writing and testifies to the 
durability of certain eighteenth- and nineteenth-century ideas, ideas that 
Eliot internalizes and reconfigures into fictional structures. By 




 address—specifically the ways in which those techniques inscribe her 
sympathetic vision—this chapter explores both Eliot’s recasting of 
Feuerbach’s humanitarian concepts into formal strategies and her 
deployment of the Victorian aesthetic of sympathy, in which she not only 
engages but also helps to invent.12 
Eliot’s direct appeals to the reader, particularly their ubiquity, 
tone, and intricacy, evidence her objective to nurture a deeply humane 
alliance between writer and audience. Through this artistic collaboration, 
Eliot seeks to generate a more empathetic and understanding readership 
motivated to change society. However, she expects something other than 
locked uniformity. As a way of strengthening and complicating this 
alliance, Eliot advocates not simple agreement but a serious and thorough 
interaction between her writing and her audience. Eliot writes to Charles 
Bray in July 1859, defining what constitutes for her the linkage between 
art’s utility as an agent of change and its moral force: “If Art does not 
enlarge men’s sympathies, it does nothing morally.” Eliot then elaborates, 
                                                
12 In Scenes of Sympathy: Identity and Representation in Victorian Fiction (2000), Audrey Jaffe 
argues that in constructing unabashedly sympathetic scenes in various Victorian 
fictional texts, nineteenth-century authors reconstitute individual identity as social 
identity. When subjects confront each other across a social divide, Jaffe maintains, “the 
elements that define this boundary constitute—at least for the moment—their 
subjectivity” (158). Jaffe proposes as a primary embodiment of the Victorian aesthetic of 
sympathy Dickens’s A Christmas Carol: a conversion text that depicts scenes of joy and of 
sorrow among various social groups, especially the impoverished and hardworking 
Cratchit family, thereby causing a sympathetic response, a change of heart, both in the 




identifying “the only effect” that she “ardently long[s] to produce” 
through her writing: 
I have had heart-cutting experience that opinions are a poor 
cement between human souls; and the only effect I ardently 
long to produce by my writings, is that those who read 
them should be better able to imagine and to feel the pains 
and the joys of those who differ from themselves in 
everything but the broad fact of being struggling erring 
human creatures. (GEL, 3: 111) 
In a subsequent August 1868 letter to physician and inventor Clifford 
Allbutt, Eliot provides confirmation that she “deliberately [and] carefully 
constructed” her novels in order to communicate the essential “goodness 
and nobleness” of human impulses: 
My books are . . . deliberately, carefully constructed on a 
basis which even in my doubting mind is never shaken by a 
doubt, and they are not determined, as conversation 
inevitably is, by considerations of momentary expediency. 
The basis I mean is my conviction as to the reality goodness 
and nobleness of human dispositions and motives. 
Eliot then expands upon this idea by specifying the single “inspiring 
principle” that motivates and emboldens her writing: 
And the inspiring principle which alone gives me courage 
to write is, that of so presenting our human life as to help 
my readers in getting a clearer conception and a more active 
admiration of those vital elements which bind men together 
and give a higher worthiness to their existence; and also to 
help them in gradually dissociating these elements from the 
more transient forms on which an outworn teaching tends 




Correspondence that Eliot receives from her audience, taken together 
with commentary of her time, suggest that Eliot elicits the particular type 
of “binding together” response she seeks. 
Eliot’s construction of such a community of readers depends upon 
three characteristics: a literary work that facilitates the writer/reader 
alliance; an author intent on assembling “those vital elements which bind 
men together and give a higher worthiness to their existence”; and an 
audience willing and able to exert upon the quotidian world the 
impositions placed upon it by a literary one. These qualities, especially 
the third, unambiguously connect to the Victorian aesthetic of sympathy. 
Contingent on an abiding confidence in the power of art to expand the 
reader’s capability for sympathetic response, this aesthetic of sympathy 
seeks to generate a change in the sensibilities of its audience so complete 
that the audience subsequently generates a change in the social 
enterprise.  
George Eliot’s direct and indirect addresses perform a crucial 
function in fashioning this alliance with her audience. While widely 
varying in substance and tone, these addresses slot into particular 
configurations. Eliot wields heavily the direct address in Adam Bede; she 
deploys the direct address once again in The Mill on the Floss but with a 




novels, Silas Marner, Romola, and Felix Holt, the Radical, the indirect 
address dominates. In Middlemarch, where the direct address seems 
ubiquitous, Eliot merges and enlarges the configurations typical of the 
first two novels. With Daniel Deronda, Eliot initiates both increased 
invention and additional withdrawal. 
Evincing Eliot’s caution that the subject matter of her novels holds 
the potential to alienate her readers, the narrators of these novels have a 
propensity to resist the direct address when the narrative drifts from 
known to foreign territory such as “a long, lonely journey, with sadness 
in the heart; away from the familiar to the strange”—the characterization 
Eliot’s narrator uses in Adam Bede to announce Hetty’s extended travel.13 
The narrator recounts Hetty’s search for her lover, during which Hetty 
delivers her baby in another town and then abandons it to die. In such 
passages, Eliot drastically reduces the number of direct appeals to the 
audience. Instead, she turns almost entirely to dramatic staging, as she 
                                                
13 For an idiosyncratic analysis of the narrator’s function in Adam Bede, see Harold 
Bloom’s introductory essay to Silas Marner (2002). Bloom argues that “The boundary 
between the novel’s fictional world and the real world of the reader grows appreciably 
fainter. Implicitly the reader is being asked to receive the opinions of the narrator in the 
same way that she has taken in Adam’s observations about one of the clerical successors 
of Mr. Irwine. So, too, when the narrator directly addresses the reader, not with a 
reminder, in the manner of Thackeray or Trollope, that the characters are subject to 
authorial whim, but to persuade him/her ‘to be in perfect charity’ towards Mr. Irwine, 
‘far as he may be from satisfying your demands on the clerical character.’ And 
elsewhere in the chapter, the reader is invited, so to speak, to cross the boundary 
between the two worlds and join forces with the narrator in the necessary human 




does in Book 6 of The Mill on the Floss, when Stephen Guest makes off 
with Maggie, and again in Middlemarch when Bulstrode and Raffles 
implicate themselves in illicit activity. 
Certain correlated arrangements emerge in these novels. For 
example, the direct appeal occurs often in Silas Marner only when Eliot 
seeks to highlight a sympathetic narrative thread by accentuating not 
Silas’s disinheritance but his assimilation into society. In the cases of Felix 
Holt, the Radical; Daniel Deronda; and Romola, Eliot employs indirect 
generalized statements, convincing because they appear to be eminently 
sensible, more often than she utilizes direct appeals. 
The later novels take on potentially risky characteristics and topics. 
For example, Eliot sets the social novel Felix Holt, the Radical at the time of 
the First Reform Act of 1832;14 the novel concerns political disputes in a 
                                                
14 For an exhaustive account of the First Reform Act of 1832, resulting events in the two 
decades subsequent, and the opening up of parliamentary proceedings to public 
scrutiny, see Kathryn Rix’s article, “‘Whatever Passed in Parliament Ought to be 
Communicated to the Public’: Reporting the Proceedings of the Reformed Commons, 
1833-50,” in Parliamentary History 33 (2014), pp. 453-474. Rix examines developments in 
the publication of parliamentary debates, considering why proposals for an official 
parliamentary record were rejected in the 1830s. The article also discusses two less well-
studied but equally vital means of publicizing parliamentary activity: the publication of 
official division lists and the sale to the public of parliamentary papers. Rix argues that 
the 1830s was a critical decade of change, influenced by shifting perceptions of the 
relationship between the reformed House of Commons and those it sought to represent. 
This was driven, in particular, by liberal notions of the importance of parliamentary 
accountability to public opinion: Members of Parliament were increasingly aware of the 
need to keep constituents informed of their parliamentary activities, whether in the 
chamber, committee room, or division lobby. The article covers a period crucially 




small English town and openly embraces subject matter many of Eliot’s 
readers would consider questionable. Romola assumes the proportions of 
sweeping historical fiction set in Papist times, with Savonarola, the 
charismatic Dominican preacher, embodying dual attributes—enthusiast 
and Catholic—that many Victorians would regard with suspicion. Daniel 
Deronda, her final novel, presents to its audience a cultural milieu distant 
and unfamiliar. George Eliot employs the direct address more often when 
her thematic concerns register as safely customary or unadventurous 
than she does when writing her more daring novels that embrace 
potentially problematic or controversial themes. 
Eliot’s turning away from the direct address suggests her being 
conscious of the requirement for tactically persuasive rhetoric. The 
turning away occurs first in the books immediately subsequent to The 
Mill on the Floss, and then again after Middlemarch—or following these 
two novels that gave contemporary critics and readers reason to distrust 
her irony, doubt her sympathy, and shy away from her sarcasm. 
Consider, for example, an anonymous critic’s dissatisfaction with Eliot’s 
“mannered sarcasms” and the “biting power of [her] acid criticism,” as 
conveyed concisely in this December 1871 Spectator review of 
Middlemarch: 
To us one of George Eliot’s great charms consists in her 




weakness; and these mannered sarcasms—which have 
always haunted her books—seem altogether out of keeping 
with that way, seem like broken lancet-points in a living 
body. Something of the cruelty of vivisection is natural in 
Thackeray’s style, and very unnatural in George Eliot’s. She 
gains her ascendancy over the imagination without 
inflicting these little superfluous wounds, and they only 
diminish it. It is the one and almost the only respect in 
which we prefer her poetry to her prose.-That in her poetry 
she does not put forth, at least in her own person, the biting 
power of this acid criticism. (Spectator XLIV, 16 Dec 1871, 
pp. 1528-1529) 
Such criticism, while acknowledging Eliot’s “charm” and her “way of 
letting the light fall on human weakness,” unwittingly violates an 
expectation Eliot holds, an expectation of reciprocity wherein sympathy 
travels in two directions. As Eliot makes clear in “The Natural History of 
German Life,” she fully anticipates engendering sympathy within her 
audience, but she also anticipates that her audience will sympathize with 
the artist and her work: 
The greatest benefit we owe to the artist, whether painter, 
poet or novelist, is the extension of our sympathies. Appeals 
founded on generalizations and statistics require a 
sympathy ready-made, a moral sentiment already in 
activity; but a picture of human life such as a great artist can 
give, surprises even the trivial and the selfish into that 
attention to what is apart from themselves, which may be 
called the raw material of moral sentiment. (Essays 270) 
It seems evident that Eliot’s rhetorical strategies perform a tricky 




challenging them, provoking their intense sympathy toward the building 
of an alliance with the author while allowing for dissent, all the while 
avoiding the looming specter of their disaffection.15 
Eliot’s pattern of reader address seems complicated even at its 
most simple. In Adam Bede, for example, a three-part arrangement holds 
sway, involving first a Feuerbachian I-Thou plea to “our” shared human 
journey, the appeal for a compassionate acknowledgment of an 
imaginary character, and a ratification of the authenticity of what “we” 
witness. This triad does not, of course, exist in each of Eliot’s direct 
addresses to the reader; one will at times occur alone, and on other 
occasions Eliot conflates two of the three.! 
In the optimum case, Eliot’s direct addresses to the reader flow 
directly out of the narrative circumstances, which in turn buttress the 
addresses. Witness the following appeal from chapter 5 of Adam Bede, 
wherein the narrator accompanies the reader into the “dining-room” and 
lays out the precise details of how the reader and the narrator will stand 
and conduct themselves in the presence of the Vicar of Havslope. Eliot’s 
                                                
15 In The Sympathetic Response: George Eliot’s Fictional Rhetoric (1981), Mary Ellen Doyle 
explicates more generally the issue of Eliot’s sympathetic rhetorical strategies. Doyle 
writes that “George Eliot clearly announces that her central aim as a writer is rhetorical. 
She wishes to influence the intellectual and emotional attitudes of real readers toward 
other people in the real world outside her books she proposes to do this by rousing 
those readers’ imaginative sympathy for fictional people inside her books. Thus her 
method also is rhetorical; her fictional materials must be managed so as to produce the 
desired effects of understanding and sympathy. Her novels therefore invite rhetorical 




narrator begins the appeal, the first phrase of which references both “me” 
and “you,” by extending the offer to “Let me take you into that dining-
room” 
and show you the Rev Adolphus Irwine, Rector of Broxton, 
Vicar of Hayslope, and Vicar of Blythe, a pluralist at whom 
the severest Church-reformer would have found it difficult 
to look sour. We will enter very softly and stand still in the 
open doorway. (47)  
Continuing to guide us after “we enter very softly,” the narrator proceeds 
to explain to the reader what “you see” and at what “we can look.” This 
explanation contributes two qualities: authoritative weight by referencing 
“our” presence and historical authenticity by alluding to the “pluralist” 
and the “Church-reformer.”16 
Eliot simultaneously promotes the reader’s sympathy for Irwine, 
because the audience must think itself more magnanimous than the 
“severest Church-reformer.” Then portraying the aging and patrician Mrs 
Irwine, Eliot conveys by way of a conversation between mother and son 
that, because the rector holds sympathy for others, he merits reciprocal 
                                                
16 The tangled associations linking writer, narrator, and narrative seem more 
pronounced in Eliot’s works than in those of other Victorian novelists. Eliot’s method 
tends to draw the reader’s attention toward the writer, toward the mechanics of the 
author’s fabrication, and so toward the writer’s own feeling. At the same time, her 
narrator’s voice speaking as “I” or “we” dominates the narrative, nearly erasing the 
border separating author from narrator. Furthermore, while the term “narrator” 
suggests a character within the province of the narrative, in fact the narrator stands 
closer to the province of the author but remains distinct from her. This complicated 
dynamic constantly impinges on the experience of reading Eliot and demands from her 




sympathy from the reader. As Irwine prepares to visit his infirm sister, 
even though his mother declares, “‘It’s of no use, child; she can’t speak to 
you . . . she has one of her worst headaches this morning,’” the narrator 
once more focuses his attention on “you,” the reader, allowing that “If 
you know how much of human speech is mere purposeless impulse or 
habit,” 
you will not wonder when I tell you that this identical 
objection had been made, and had received the same kind 
of answer, many hundred times in the course of the fifteen 
years that Mr. Irwine’s sister Anne had been an invalid. 
Splendid old ladies, who take a long time to dress in the 
morning, have often slight sympathy with sickly daughters. 
(49)  
Beginning the passage with a contingent “if” that offers “you” a way out, 
Eliot judiciously tempers this appeal to the audience, one designed most 
of all to invoke shared experience. Eliot has the narrator authenticate the 
appeal by invoking a prior fifteen-year period during which the same 
back-and-forth had occurred “many hundred times.” Finally, the 
narrator’s observation concerning “splendid old ladies” reinforces the 
reader’s affinity for Irwine and produces a sense of empathy for the 
infirm. For the reader, the narrator’s judgment either intensifies or 
ameliorates the criticism of this particular “splendid” old lady, 





Eliot carefully positions this exchange near the first part of chapter 
5. At the chapter’s conclusion the narrator, wielding extended passages, 
unabashedly exhorts the audience and argues on behalf of Irwine, despite 
Irwine’s careless religious stances. Eliot’s narrator makes an effort to 
charitably characterize Irwine, describing him as 
one of those large-hearted, sweet-blooded natures that 
never know a narrow or a grudging thought; Epicurean, if 
you will, with no enthusiasm, no self-scourging sense of 
duty; but yet, as you have seen, of a sufficiently subtle 
moral fibre to have an unwearying tenderness for obscure 
and monotonous suffering. It was his large-hearted 
indulgence that made him ignore his mother’s hardness 
towards her daughters. (59) 
Nevertheless, since Eliot has just now introduced the audience to Mr 
Irwine, her appeal to the reader (“as you have seen”) seems to land with a 
weight greater than the passage can fully support. The hyperbole reveals 
two pertinent authorial issues: first, Eliot’s great investment in the 
narrative point she wishes to make and, second, her acute awareness that 
her nineteenth-century audience would possess maximum interest in 
Irwine’s religious affiliation. 
Again in the subsequent section, the three features of the pattern 
appear, lending expressiveness and depth to the passage but also further 
betraying Eliot’s inclination to confirm through her writer’s voice 




half subsequent to Hetty’s conviction of murder and positioned in the 
decisive chapter 50, the section begins, 
For Adam, though you see him quite master of himself, 
working hard and delighting in his work after his inborn 
inalienable nature, had not outlived his sorrow—had not 
felt it slip from him as a temporary burthen, and leave him 
the same man again. 
This extended appeal to the reader begins by addressing the singular 
“you” (“you see him”) and concludes by expanding outward to include 
the communal “us,” “we,” and “our,” when Eliot’s narrator asks: 
Do any of us? God forbid. It would be a poor result of all 
our anguish and our wrestling, if we won nothing but our 
old selves at the end of it—if we could return to the same 
blind loves, the same self-confident blame, the same light 
thoughts of human suffering, the same frivolous gossip 
over blighted human lives, the same feeble sense of that 
Unknown towards which we have sent forth irrepressible 
cries in our loneliness. Let us rather be thankful that our 
sorrow lives in us as an indestructible force, only changing 
its form, as forces do, and passing from pain into 
sympathy—the one poor word which includes all our best 
insight and our best love. . . . Desire is chastened into 
submission, and we are contented with our day when we 
have been able to bear our grief in silence and act as if we 
were not suffering. For it is at such periods that the sense of 
our lives having visible and invisible relations, beyond any 
of which either our present or prospective self is the centre, 
grows like a muscle that we are obliged to lean on and 
exert. (407) 
Therefore the conversion of “pain” passing into “sympathy” undergone 




processes of society. However, Eliot maps this arrangement perhaps too 
neatly. She conveys to the audience that “Tender and deep as his love for 
Hetty had been—so deep that the roots of it would never be torn away” 
(54, 442), when, in fact, the history of Adam’s and Hetty’s relationship 
suggests that Adam’s “love” could more aptly be characterized as blind 
and superficial rather than “tender and deep.” Consequently, Eliot’s 
aesthetic of sympathy and the ideology of social harmony, rather than 
essential narrative imperatives, appear to govern and shape the structure 
of the passage. 
Particularly because Eliot’s narrator transforms a sorrowful 
occurrence into a positive assertion, this disposition must have appeared 
adequate for Eliot’s nineteenth-century audience. The narrator of Adam 
Bede regularly casts a beneficent clarification on the shared understanding 
on which the audience appeal hinges. Eliot stipulates in this, her first 
novel, that the “judicious historian abstains from narrating precisely what 
ensued,” and then emphasizes to the audience, “You understand” (12, 
109). “We” the readers do understand that in this formulation Eliot 
proposes herself as the “judicious historian.” However, when 
subsequently conveying the extent of Arthur’s predicament, the narrator 
sets the “truthful” against the “judicious,” denigrating the “judicious” as 




George Eliot harbors discomfort and uncertainty toward the use of 
these “tactics,” and her ambivalence surfaces in her drawing of characters 
in novels beyond Adam Bede. Eliot characterizes as obligatory and even 
commendable Philip Wakem’s maneuvers to win his father’s acceptance. 
She depicts, first as worthy then as deceitful, Savonarola’s calculations in 
his dealings with church and state. Eliot casts Tito, the definitive plotter, 
as utterly appalling. Brooke, who schemes incompetently, Eliot portrays 
as foolish. 
The issue of tactics proves problematic and fundamental for 
George Eliot, because it seems to call into question the genuineness 
demanded by the foundational aesthetic of sympathy. Traces of this 
predicament emerge even in Adam Bede, the novel that persuades her 
nineteenth-century audience of Eliot’s sincerity. The words, “Awake, my 
soul,” inaugurate the song that opens the first chapter of Adam Bede and 
ushers the audience into Adam’s workshop; the workshop’s “concert of 
the tools and Adam’s voice,” concludes with an appeal to “be sincere”: 
Let all thy converse be sincere.! 
Thy conscience as the noonday clear. (1, 5-6)  
Subsequently in Book 2, “In Which the Story Pauses a Little,” in order to 
rouse the audience, Eliot’s narrator admits that 
I am afraid I have often smiled with hypocritical assent. . . . 




discharge my conscience, and declare . . . that human nature 
is lovable — the way I have learnt something of its deep 
pathos, its sublime mysteries. (157) 
The narrator in this passage makes observations at once doubting and 
confirmatory, reserved and candid, even while he urgently “discharge[s] 
[his] conscience.” 
As if to deliberately call attention to this thorny issue of tactics, 
Eliot abruptly and startlingly inserts a reference to “one of my readers” 
into the opening lines of Adam Bede, chapter 17: 
“THIS Rector of Broxton is little better than a pagan!” I hear 
one of my readers exclaim. “How much more edifying it 
would have been if you had made him give Arthur some 
truly spiritual advice! You might have put into his mouth 
the most beautiful things — quite as good as reading a 
sermon.” 
Eliot then writes the pronoun “I”; in so doing she interjects the presence 
of the novelist herself: 
Certainly I could, if I held it the highest vocation of the 
novelist to represent things as they never have been and 
never will be. Then, of course, I might refashion life and 
character entirely after my own liking. 
These passages illustrate the technique (or tactic) Eliot uses to deftly 
construct a novel in which the reader constantly feels the novelist’s 
presence and where the novelist in turn feels no obligation to vanish into 
the fiction in the way Flaubert or James would.  Eliot’s technique 




inclusive, a work that unites characters, audience, and author together in 
a secular, unbordered fictional world.  
Eliot takes more risks with sincere “human converse” when 
writing The Mill on the Floss. The success of Adam Bede perhaps emboldens 
her to test the limits she had previously set. Nevertheless, Eliot can no 
longer remain obscured behind her mask. 1859 brings the release of Adam 
Bede, and once Queen Victoria reads the novel and praises it, sales of the 
book soar. Yet there remains a mystery as to George Eliot’s true identity. 
John Chapman had already revealed to certain members of the London 
literary community the name hiding behind the pseudonym. Months of 
gossip that Eliot attempts to challenge in order to suppress the secret 
forces her to unmask the identity even as she works on the first book of 
The Mill on the Floss. This gossip may very well have triggered Eliot’s 
hostility toward the public, hostility that infuses several of her narrative 
addresses.  
George Eliot endeavors in The Mill on the Floss to expose a certain 
shallow sophistication affected by some women—including some of her 
female readers—by unveiling the crudity and inflexibility this 
“sophistication” disguises.17 At the point in The Mill on the Floss where St 
                                                
17 This theme of shallowness and women recalls “Silly Novels by Lady Novelists,” an 
essay by George Eliot published anonymously in the Westminster Review in 1856. The 
essay criticizes many novels written by and for women, objecting to their “silliness” and 
willful disregard for reality. While Eliot acknowledges that “Fiction is a department of 




Ogg’s harshly appraises Maggie, “we” merges with the “public opinion, 
[which] in these cases, is always of the feminine gender” (55, 428).18 Eliot 
directs other critiques toward men. For example, she upbraids the often 
inflexible, kneejerk, morally careless actions taken by merchants or civil 
employees. On more than one occasion Eliot highlights “a touch of 
human experience which I flatter myself will come home to the bosoms of 
not a few substantial or distinguished men” (48, 345). Eliot’s comments 
directed exclusively at males register in no individual case as caustic as 
her remarks on the “world’s wife.” However, because such comments 
occur infrequently in Victorian fiction, their aggregate seizes the attention 
of the reader. 
                                                                                                                               
asserts that “silly novels” undercut the cause of women’s education. Eliot notices that 
the heroines in these novels enjoy a high level of education, but this education often 
renders them self-satisfied and tiresome. Furthermore, the writers of these novels have 
evidently read a great deal, but their reading, Eliot argues, has not prepared them to 
write well. Eliot maintains that their own writings mistake “vagueness for depth, 
bombast for eloquence, and affectation for originality” (316). Eliot fears that readers of 
such silly novels will come to the conclusion that women do not benefit from 
education—even though, as she takes care to remind her readers, there do exist truly 
great female writers. Eliot counts Harriet Martineau and Charlotte Brontë among them. 
18 Elizabeth Ermarth’s article, “Maggie Tulliver’s Long Suicide” (2014), examines Maggie 
Tulliver’s problematic cultural status as ambitious female and how that position 
mandates her eventual demise. The presence of the word “suicide” in Ermarth’s title can 
be regarded as ironic, because there exists scant evidence within Eliot’s novel that 
Maggie takes her own life. Maggie is, of course, the victim of a series of narrative events 
that culminate in a flood that destroys her home and much of her village. However, 
Ermarth asserts that Maggie’s death assumes a wider meaning when considered within 
the context of nineteenth-century history and particularly with respect to female 
intellectuals and writers. Ermarth’s argument parallels the observations of other critics 
who find a correspondence between the circumstances of George Eliot the author and 




In The Mill on the Floss the direct appeal performs the same 
function as in Adam Bede: it encourages the audience’s sympathetic 
reaction by making a plea to shared experience. However, its overall 
pitch modulates to a conspicuously different register. The direct 
addresses in The Mill on the Floss, when most persuasive, present an 
appeal to the frailties all humans possess; the least convincing of these 
addresses seem patronizing, hectoring, or harshly accusatory. Eliot’s 
characteristic appeal to common experience exhibits irony, false 
attribution, or questionable statements: “Poor relations are undeniably 
irritating—their existence is so entirely uncalled for on our part, and they 
are almost always very faulty people” (8, 74). 
While Adam Bede tends to uplift, frequently referencing for 
example the audience’s “best self,” The Mill on the Floss persistently 
demands the reader face a self that seems disturbingly craven, insecure, 
and needlessly destructive. “It is easy enough to spoil the lives of our 
neighbours,” the narrator blithely begins the following passage, “without 
taking so much trouble”:  
It is easy enough to spoil the lives of our neighbors without 
taking so much trouble; we can do it by lazy acquiescence 
and lazy omission, by trivial falsities for which we hardly 
know a reason, by small frauds neutralized by small 
extravagancies, by maladroit flatteries, and clumsily 
improvised insinuations. We live from hand to mouth, most 




else than snatch a morsel to satisfy the hungry brood, rarely 
thinking of seed-corn or the next year’s crop.  (3, 23)  
George Eliot endeavors time and again in The Mill on the Floss to 
leverage the audience’s agreement by drawing explicit linkages, 
comparisons designed to force “distinguished men” and “refined” 
women to identify in themselves the small-mindedness that marks the 
citizenry of St Ogg’s. Eliot’s usage of this mode of striking, intimidating 
address occurs first in an unvarnished rebuke from “Janet’s Repentance,” 
wherein Eliot writes that  
it is easy to understand that our discernment of men’s 
motives must depend on the completeness of the elements 
we can bring from our own susceptibility and our own 
experience. See to it, friend, before you pronounce a too 
hasty judgement, that your own moral sensibilities are not 
of a hoofed or clawed character.” (SCL, 2, 324). 
!In The Mill on the Floss, however, Eliot deploys this manner of 
solicitation in a more complex and highly evolved fashion. Adam Bede 
shows Eliot eschewing harsh commentary, perhaps because its tone had 
inflamed Blackwood’s anxiety about her cynicism. The reoccurrence of 
Eliot’s disapproving manner implies a degree of self-awareness in her 
adjustment of tone and a deliberate abrasiveness in the irony directed at 
the audience.  
The Mill on the Floss contains intimidating appeals that often seem 




“light and graceful irony’’ of “good society” indicate Eliot’s attempt to 
exert a measure of moderation. For example, the “emphasis of want” 
lines contain an apology, an appeal to authenticity, and a subtle 
questioning of certain “eligible” subjects. “In writing the history of 
unfashionable families,” Eliot observes that 
one is apt to fall into a tone of emphasis which is very far 
from being the tone of good society, where principles and 
beliefs are not only of an extremely moderate kind, but are 
always presupposed, no subjects being eligible but such as 
can be touched with a light irony. (32, 255) 
This passage and subsequent ones evince Eliot’s efforts to adjust tone. 
The narrator uses generic adjective and noun pairings (“national life,” 
“good society”) and indefinite pronouns (“it,” “one,” “some”) to replace 
the more emphatic accusatory personal pronouns at times when the 
criticism turns intensely strident. Eliot saves the “you” for such 
inconsequential acts as exploring “the stuffing of your couch” and 
reserves “ourselves” and “us” for occasions when she wants to invoke 
“active love for what is not of ourselves” or for calling upon the 
sympathy required when “human looks are hard upon us” (255-256).  
In any case, the fervent social commentary of The Mill on the 
Floss—impugning those who form “their moral judgment solely by 
general rules, thinking that these will lead them to justice by a ready-




discrimination, impartiality”—and the novel’s encouragement of “wide 
fellow-feeling with all that is human” seem perilously juxtaposed. Eliot 
injects positive attributes into her audience appeals mainly by invoking 
nostalgic veneration of the past and by vivid expressions of fellowship. 
The novel’s persistent yoking of past and present pushes onto the 
audience illusory notions of unity and permanence. At the same time, The 
Mill on the Floss also stipulates that such qualities do not characterize 
either St Ogg’s or the world of Eliot’s Victorian readers. 
This yearning for unity and the acknowledgement of its absence 
make confusing those ironic appeals that compare past and present. 
Eliot’s robust assertions of fellowship, which seem to emerge when the 
narrative action implies disunity and difference, seem likewise perilously 
juxtaposed. One such passage describes an encounter between Maggie 
and Dr Kenn wherein Kenn encourages an equivocating Maggie to 
become a “permanent parishioner” while he simultaneously points out to 
her that she stubbornly maintains her distance. As an uncomfortable 
Maggie attempts to escape the situation, she says, “‘Oh, I must go,’” while 
wearing an expression that betrays her feeling that “she had told him her 
history in those three words.” The narrator then describes the encounter 
as 
one of those moments of implicit revelation which will 




transiently, — on a mile’s journey, perhaps, or when resting 
by the wayside. There is always this possibility of a word or 
look from a stranger to keep alive the sense of human 
brotherhood. 
Here, Eliot clearly depends on Dr Kenn “to keep alive the sense of human 
brotherhood” in both Maggie and the audience. However, the novel 
implies that Kenn shares his parishioners’ deficiency of genuine kindness 
and tolerance. Therefore, Eliot’s writing that “most of us . . . would have 
welcomed a priest of that natural order” suggests Eliot’s imaginative 
wish for Dr Kenn more than the social realities that generate the irony 
permeating Book 6.! 
Arbitrating most reliably between writer and audience, then, are 
those appeals that draw distinctions between individual human beings 
and invite general inquiries about order as opposed to those that propose 
all-inclusive fellowship or a charitable natural order. Eliot writes that 
for dear Tom, who always had that pleasant smile when he 
looked at cousin Lucy, to turn completely round, say the 
opposite of what he had always said before, and declare 
that he, for his part, was delighted that all the old 
grievances should be healed, and that Maggie should have 
Philip with all suitable despatch; in cousin Lucy’s opinion 
nothing could be easier. 
But to minds strongly marked by the positive and 
negative qualities that create severity—strength of will, 
conscious rectitude of purpose, narrowness of imagination 
and intellect, great power of self-control, and a disposition 
to exert control over others—prejudices come as the natural 
food of tendencies which can get no sustenance out of that 




we call truth. Let a prejudice be bequeathed, carried in the 
air, adopted by hearsay, caught in through the eye,—how 
ever it may come, these minds will give it a habitation; it is 
something to assert strongly and bravely, something to fill 
up the void of spontaneous ideas. . . . Our good upright 
Tom Tulliver’s mind was of this class. (51, 400) 
Eliot’s narrator in this section deftly disconnects the audience from 
Tom by specifying that “All people of broad, strong sense have an 
instinctive repugnance to the men of maxims” and furthermore that “the 
mysterious complexity of our life is not to be embraced by maxims” or 
“formulas” (55, 435). Eliot stages the idea that they “repress” our 
“growing insight and sympathy” by foregrounding both Tom’s response 
to Maggie and Maggie’s “deep rooted” childhood fear of Tom: 
Her brother was the human being of whom she had been 
most afraid from her childhood upward; afraid with that 
fear which springs in us when we love one who is 
inexorable, unbending, unmodifiable—with a mind that we 
can never mould ourselves upon, and yet that we cannot 
endure to alienate from us. (54, 422) 
Eliot subtly primes the reader to empathize with Maggie’s dread of Tom 
by aligning Tom with particular adjectival qualities of the laws of 
nature—”inexorable, unbending, unmodifiable”—that leave no room for 
accommodation or sympathy.19 
                                                
19 Paul A. Makurath treats the issue of nature’s laws in “The Symbolism of the Flood in 
Eliot’s The Mill on the Floss,” in Studies in the Novel 7 (1975), pp. 298-300. Makurath begins 
by pointing out that the culminating flood serves as a “quite obvious” symbol of wild, 
destructive nature and its function as a determinate of human destiny. Makurath goes 




Writing in an intermittently scolding and depressing tone, George 
Eliot disaffects a sizeable portion of her audience with The Mill on the 
Floss, but with Silas Marner she returns to their good graces. Eliot 
accomplishes this rehabilitation in two ways: by deemphasizing the 
“emphasis of want” (which drearily accentuates humans living “in a chill, 
uncarpeted fashion, amidst family discord unsoftened by long corridors”) 
and by more conscientiously maintaining the space that separates writer 
from audience. Eliot’s appeals to the reader again promote those ideals 
she stages in Silas Marner, the modest principles of domesticity and 
friendliness. Even when the narrator overtly switches on the criticism, the 
implied links between the reader’s experiences and events in the novel 
resonate in only unthreatening and inoffensive ways. Eliot’s narrator first 
raises the question of “why we are seldom able to comfort our 
neighbours with our words” and then speculates in an understanding 
tone that 
our goodwill gets adulterated, in spite of ourselves, before it 
can pass our lips. We can send black puddings and pettitoes 
without giving them a flavour of our own egoism; but 
language is a stream that is almost sure to smack of a 
mingled soil. (10, 130-131) 
                                                                                                                               
individuals for social superiority. As evidence for this claim, he points out that Maggie’s 
brother, Tom, finds himself on the precipice of a new and improved social ascendancy at 
the very moment the flood washes away everything that Tom, Maggie, and all the 
novel’s characters hold dear. However, Makurath’s article posits three other meanings 
for the flood: as an agent of death, as a factor in the fate of economic enterprises, and as 




By casting Silas as a pariah who bestows “a blessing on himself by acting 
like a father to a lone motherless child” and who carries the baggage of a 
“strange history,” Eliot adroitly appeals to the reader’s sympathies. At 
the same time, she prevents the appeal from turning uncomfortably 
intrusive by enforcing a subtle detachment between audience and writer. 
Refusing to risk offending her audience with intensely personal allusions 
to “you,” “we,” and “our,” Eliot instead makes only vague insinuations 
by safely citing “all men,” “everyone,” “people,” “a man,” “a woman,” 
and “anyone.” Tellingly, such allusions occur at junctures where the 
narrative distances Godfrey from himself or where it detaches Silas from 
the people of Raveloe.! 
Urging the audience to empathize with Godfrey’s uniquely human 
dependence on luck and coincidence, Eliot deploys the direct address to 
build this identification, but the deployment remains circumspect and 
innocuous. For example, Eliot encourages the reader to identify with 
Godfrey, and he ultimately makes himself an acceptable figure. Eliot also 
casts the reader as at least morally equal to the characters of Silas Marner 
and superior with respect to general “culture.” The contrast to The Mill on 
the Floss, wherein Eliot distances the audience from the comfortably 
known, makes a distinct impression; in Silas Marner what at first registers 




constructs ultimately strengthens the writer and audience rapport. The 
novel’s widespread solicitations to shared experience avoid provoking 
antipathy while expanding in a nonthreatening way the audience’s 
understanding. 
With Romola, Eliot again places the audience at a remove; however, 
she alters the tenor of the novel and makes narrative and historical 
similitude a pronounced feature of the novel. By showing belligerent and 
damaging aggression as a shared characteristic of the commercial 
societies of nineteenth-century England and fifteenth-century Florence, 
Romola’s direct appeals seem designed to eliminate the divide between 
them.20 The parallels between past and present, Eliot writes, can be 
“explained by our seeing” the Florentine Bardi family 
as standing in the very front of European commerce—the 
Christian Rothschilds of that time—undertaking to furnish 
specie for the wars of our Edward the Third, and having 
revenues “in kind” made over to them; especially in wool, 
most precious of freights for Florentine galleys. (5, 43) 
                                                
20 For an examination of the often-paradoxical characteristics of Victorian society 
documented by Eliot in Romola and her other novels, see George Eliot: The Last Victorian 
(2001) by Kathryn Hughes. Hughes treats the conflicted circumstances of Eliot’s life and 
acknowledges that Eliot wrote her works after years of living unconventionally, 
including a scandalous voyage to Europe with the married writer and editor George 
Henry Lewes. The scandal intensified when she moved in with Lewes after he separated 
from his wife. Hughes also explores the ways in which Eliot re-entered London’s social 
life years later, when her literary success made it impossible for respectable society to 
dismiss her (even Queen Victoria enjoyed her books). Hughes notes that Eliot counted 






However, unfortunate circumstances befall the family Bardi. As the 
narrator explains, 
Their august debtor left them with an august deficit, and 
alarmed Sicilian creditors made a too sudden demand for 
the payment of deposits, causing a ruinous shock to the 
credit of the Bardi and of associated houses. 
Eliot in Romola makes her analogies subtly, so subtly that when Victorian 
critics complained, they did so because they ignored or overlooked the 
narrative correspondence drawn by Eliot between Renaissance Florence 
and nineteenth-century England. Finding the correlation between the two 
societies cleverly marked, British intellectuals understood Romola, but 
many of Eliot’s readers found the novel unusually erudite but stilted and 
unmoving. Critic R.H. Hutton voiced the ambivalence of many when he 
wrote in an 1863 review that “of Romola it is less easy to say whether one 
is absolutely satisfied or not.” 
In terms of form, the dynamic existing in Romola between the 
indirect and direct address suggests a slow evolution toward the 
balanced intricacy that distinguishes Eliot’s later novels. In Romola, this 
middle novel, the indirect address generally governs the narrative. For 
the first time, Eliot routinely makes prophetic utterances about “a mixed 
condition of things,” one such utterance invoking a “sign” that indicates 




The same society has had a gibbet for the murderer and a 
gibbet for the martyr, an execrating hiss for a dastardly act, 
and as loud a hiss for many a word of generous truthfulness 
or just insight: a mixed condition of things which is the sign, 
not of hopeless confusion, but of struggling order. (57, 462)  
Here, the voice of the oracle speaks convincingly of “struggling order,” 
thereby displacing the individual with the societal while attempting to 
neutralize any sense of life as hopelessly confused or exhaustively 
difficult.   
On the other hand, the direct solicitations of Romola routinely pull 
the audience away from the societal into the “hopeless confusion” and 
uncertainty endured by individual characters. As an example, when 
Romola nervously contemplates “violently rending her life in two” as a 
consequence of leaving Tito, Eliot directly addresses “us” and explains 
that Romola’s pending action 
had a power unexplained to herself, of shaking Romola. It is 
the way with half the truth amidst which we live, that it 
only haunts us and makes dull pulsations that are never 
born into sound. (36, 313)  
In a comparable way, when circumstances dictate that Savonarola suffer 
persecution by fire, thereby challenging the Dominican’s faith, the 
narrator probingly wonders 
Were not Fra Domenico and Fra Mariano, and scores of 
Piagnoni besides, ready to enter the fire? What was the 
cause of their superior courage, if it was not their superior 




satisfactorily to his friends, even if he had been able to 
explain it thoroughly to himself. And he was not. Our 
naked feelings make haste to clothe themselves in 
propositions which lie at hand among our store of opinions, 
and to give a true account of what passes within us 
something else is necessary besides sincerity, even when 
sincerity is unmixed. (64, 511) ! 
At this moment in the novel, Eliot’s binary addresses, the disturbing 
indirect and the comforting direct, remain stubbornly unreconciled. The 
inability to effect any significant amalgamation of the two modes, 
combined with the supremacy of the indirect address, make inevitable 
the novel’s stultifying quality. Presumably in order to calm the reader’s 
unease, Romola provides simple pronouncements and pays a price for 
doing so. In the final analysis, Eliot approaches but finally neglects to 
exploit the multiple-address complications that would have animated her 
work. 
In Felix Holt, the Radical, Eliot returns to provincial familiarity, 
introducing her audience to the fictitious community of Treby in the 
English Midlands in 1832, the time of the First Reform Act. Displaying 
what reassured readers would regard as a renewed and refreshing 
equanimity and calmness of tone, Eliot in Felix Holt takes to heart lessons 
learned from the muted-to-negative responses to Adam Bede and The Mill 




effectiveness the techniques of dissociation she refined in Silas Marner 
and Romola. 
Ironically, however, the openness, tranquility, and 
evenhandedness critics perceive in the author of Felix Holt starkly oppose 
the uncertainty, diminished confidence, and dejection Eliot regularly 
suffers, along with questionable health, while writing the novel. Her 
publisher, John Blackwood, inspired by the prospect of a George Eliot 
novel relevant to current affairs, writes her an encouraging letter about 
the work; he receives a response in which Eliot reveals having been 
chronically plagued by depression: 
How very good it was of you to write me a letter which is a 
guarantee to me of the pleasantest kind that I have made 
myself understood. The tone of the prevalent literature just 
now is not encouraging to a writer who at least wishes to be 
serious and sincere, and, owing to my want of health, a 
great deal of this book has been written under so much 
depression as to its practical effectiveness, that I have 
sometimes been ready to give it up. (GEL, 4, 247-248)  
Three excerpts from Eliot’s writing indicate the cautionary and measured 
judgment she musters while writing Felix Holt. Her letter to Blackwood 
provides the first:  
Your letter has made me feel, more strongly than any other 
testimony, that it would have been a pity if I had listened to 
the tempter Despondency.—I took a great deal of pains to 
get a true idea of the period. My own recollections of it are 




illuminate my reading. I went through the Times of 1832-33 
at the British Museum, to be sure of as many details as I 
could. It is amazing what strong language was used in those 
days, especially about the Church. The Times is full of 
turgid denunciation; “bloated pluralists,” “stall-fed 
dignitaries” etc. are the sort of phrases conspicuous in the 
leaders. There is one passage of prophecy which I longed to 
quote, but I thought it wiser to abstain. “Now the beauty of 
the Reform Bill is, that under its mature operation the 
people must and will become free agents”—a prophecy 
which I hope is true, only the maturity of the operation has 
not arrived yet.  
Excerpt two indicates the outcome of Eliot’s decision that ultimately “it is 
wiser to abstain.” In the Epilogue to Felix Holt, she writes: 
As to all that wide parish of Treby Magna, it has since 
prospered as the rest of England has prospered. Doubtless 
there is more enlightenment now. Whether the farmers are 
all public-spirited, the shopkeepers nobly independent, the 
Sproxton men entirely sober and judicious, the Dissenters 
quite without narrowness or asperity in religion and 
politics, and the publicans all fit, like Gaius, to be the 
friends of an apostle—these things I have not heard, not 
having correspondence in those parts.  
Chapter 16 of Felix Holt provides a third passage that indicates the ways 
in which Eliot, paying close attention to detail, cultivates the results of her 
aforementioned Times research at the British Museum:  
Crying abuses—”bloated paupers,” “bloated pluralists,” 
and other corruptions hindering men from being wise and 
happy—had to be fought against and slain. Such a time is a 
time of hope. Afterwards, when the corpses of those 
monsters have been held up to the public wonder and 




but rather a more abundant breeding of the foolish and 
unhappy, comes a time of doubt and despondency. But in 
the great Reform year Hope was mighty: the prospect of 
Reform had even served the voters instead of drink; and in 
one place, at least, there had been “a dry election.” (271) 
Notably, Eliot releases the narrator from accountability for these 
portrayals (from being “held up to the [reader’s] wonder and 
abhorrence”) by making “bloated paupers” and “bloated pluralists” cited 
phrases; the conscientious researcher merely quotes his source. However, 
Eliot also indiscernibly rewrites the Times. Where the denunciation in the 
Times treats only the gentry, Eliot’s litany of wrongs specifies the wealthy 
and the indigent, the notorious and the reputable. Eliot also employs this 
sleight-of-hand of spotlighting everyone and no one in the Epilogue, 
where the tone softens to conciliatory: “throughout that neighborhood 
[Transome Court] there was silence about the past.” In chapter 16, which 
calls for a more weighty approach, the authorial attitude shifts to 
contemplative rather than forceful. 
Eliot’s complicated devices in Felix Holt, the Radical—most often 
techniques for avoiding culpability: submission to imposing precedent 
(Sophocles, Lucretius, Dante, the Bible, Euripides), personification, wide 
generalizations—cushion the harshness of the social reproach. Reflecting 
her book’s tendency to admonish only obliquely, Eliot postulates that 




lash.” Approaching the end of chapter 42, she embarks upon an extended 
musing caused by the accusatory but earnest words of Mrs Transome in 
her argumentative “interview” with Jermyn. The narrator, as the passage 
concludes, maintains that 
Human beings in moments of passionate reproach and 
denunciation, especially when their anger is on their own 
account, are never so wholly in the right that the person 
who has to wince cannot possibly protest against some 
unreasonableness or unfairness in their outburst. . . . Men 
do not become penitent and learn to abhor themselves by 
having their backs cut open with the lash; rather, they learn 
to abhor the lash. (520)  
Here the narrator invokes first “human beings” and proximately 
afterward “men,” deftly sidestepping the direct appeal. The exception 
occurs when alluding in the subsequent paragraph to “a touch of 
something that makes us all akin” as Jermyn contemplates the “clearest 
and most unpleasant result of the interview” (519-521). 
Chapter 16’s previously quoted section concerning the “great 
Reform year” features unflinching characterizations made by Eliot’s 
narrator. However, these characterizations occur only in the passage that 
invokes “corpses” and “abundant breeding,” words themselves related to 
the novel’s organic philosophy. Organic principles inform numerous 




lengthy direct solicitation within this now well-known paragraph found 
near the conclusion of chapter 3:  
These social changes in Treby parish are comparatively 
public matters, and this history is chiefly concerned with 
the private lot of a few men and women; but there is no 
private life which has not been determined by a wider 
public life. . . . And the lives we are about to look back upon 
. . . are rooted in the common earth, having to endure all the 
ordinary chances of past and present weather. 
Culminating in yet another organic reference to “the common earth,” this 
passage that began with the narrator’s indirect address soon evolves into 
the direct appeal found in “the lives we are about to look back upon.” 
The change encloses the audience within the “mutual influence of 
dissimilar destinies which we shall see gradually unfolding itself” (3, 129) 
and exemplifies the ways in which Eliot routinely subsumes in Felix Holt 
virtually all adverse aspects, at least those not either dissociated or 
softened, into the novel’s fundamentally affirmative organic philosophy.21  
                                                
21 In the 1868 essay, “Address to Working Men, by Felix Holt,” a kind of addendum to 
her novel Felix Holt, the Radical (1866), Eliot expresses a more negative although 
ultimately constructive view of the state of Victorian England. Under the name of her 
novel’s fictional character Felix Holt, Eliot composed the piece for Blackwood’s Magazine 
during the period leading up to the Reform Act of 1867. Eliot’s choice of pseudonym 
suggests that she finds such distancing a necessary technique for voicing her opinions 
outside the political mainstream. During a period when journalistic articles were not 
signed, the name “Felix Holt” was familiar to readers who had read Eliot’s 1866 novel. A 
few days after she began writing the essay, Blackwood urged her on: “You have the 
knowledge of what the working men ought to do and the real feeling towards them 
which will give a force to your words which no ordinary address could possibly 
possess.” An ordinary address presumably would be neither fictional nor written by a 




!In Middlemarch, Eliot’s direct solicitations to the reader extend the 
techniques of The Mill on the Floss as well as those used in other prior 
novels. This extension generates both surprisingly intricate tonal shifts 
and persistent engagement with the novelist. Eliot controls these 
ubiquitous addresses with such deftness that she creates different modes 
of exchange involving narrator and audience: the most audacious 
exchanges generate a break; the most understated leave the audience 
uncertain of having been implicated. For example, the following address 
concerning the “stealthy convergence of human lots” found in chapter 11 
of Middlemarch brings the audience to a standstill. Eliot writes that 
any one watching keenly the stealthy convergence of 
human lots, sees a slow preparation of effects from one life 
on another, which tells like a calculated irony on the 
indifference or the frozen stare with which we look at our 
unintroduced neighbor. Destiny stands by sarcastic with 
our dramatis personae folded in her hand. 
The passage so struck reviewer A.V. Dicey that he felt compelled to turn 
Eliot’s own words against her, castigating the Middlemarch author in his 
January 1873 Nation review for encouraging “the part of the ‘destiny 
which stands by sarcastic.’” 
                                                                                                                               
a political process from which she was excluded was highly dubious, Blackwood 
emphasized feeling as the force behind her knowledge. When the Felix Holt essay was 
completed, Blackwood approved, musing that “if the mass could appreciate rightly such 




Eliot contours other Middlemarch sections by shifting among 
character, narrator, and reader. This technique activates a dynamic 
especially appropriate to a novel that insists its audience experience and 
understand from markedly dissimilar centers of consciousness, thereby 
causing the audience to imagine situations vastly different from those it 
has lived. These shifts reflect and intensify the various modifications 
applied to the characters of Middlemarch by the narrator.22 For instance, 
the narrator first allows that the Reverend Mr Farebrother, unlike “the 
majority of us,” “could excuse others for thinking slightly of him, and 
could judge impartially of their conduct even when it told against him.” 
Immediately thereafter, however, the narrator veers off in a different 
direction, conceding that the Reverend’s “talk was not always 
inspiriting,” for 
he had escaped being a Pharisee, but he had not escaped 
that low estimate of possibilities which we rather hastily 
arrive at as an inference from our own failure. Lydgate 
thought that there was a pitiable infirmity of will in Mr. 
Farebrother. (18, 139) 
In comparison to her handling of Farebrother, Eliot puts distance between 
her narrator and Dorothea, a character John Holloway aptly calls one 
                                                
22 For an enlightening analysis that treats Eliot’s shifting techniques in Middlemarch, see 
Derek Oldfield’s “The Language of the Novel: The Character of Dorothea,” in 
Middlemarch: Critical Approaches to the Novel (1967), pp. 63-86. Oldfield points out that 
Eliot’s “judgments are constantly modified or restricted in some way, whether by such 





“who for all her fineness labours under foolish and disastrous delusions” 
(131). Eliot describes a “blind” Dorothea, caught up in the disorienting 
first days of her marriage to Casaubon, whose “words were among the 
most cutting and irritating” to her husband: 
She was as blind to his inward troubles as he to hers: she 
had not yet learned those hidden conflicts in her husband 
which claim our pity. She had not yet listened patiently to 
his heartbeats, but only felt that her own was beating 
violently. (20, 148) 
Barbara Hardy and Derek Oldfield have observed that Eliot, by 
adjusting the tenor and stresses of a passage, often purposefully widens 
or narrows the gap separating the author from a given character. This 
widening or narrowing applies also to the distance between author and 
reader. The prevailing modes of direct solicitations in Middlemarch, 
especially considering their various groupings and incorporations into 
the previous novels, suggest most of all the care and deliberation with 
which Eliot assembles them.23 
Of course, Eliot’s different novels display different characteristics. 
Whereas both Middlemarch and Romola generate significant uncertainty, 
only Middlemarch unflinchingly faces that uncertainty. Eliot suffuses the 
                                                
23 Derek Oldfield notices in his contribution to Middlemarch: Critical Approaches to the 
Novel that Eliot develops “three different stylistic methods in her presentation of 
Dorothea. First, there it is her allegedly direct narrator’s voice; then there is the 
dramatization of Dorothy’s own speech; and finally there is George Eliot’s method of 




dominant modes of direct address in Middlemarch with an encompassing 
sense of human struggle and intricacy; this quality has the effect of 
placing the audience in the midst of ongoing conflict in which the 
preponderance of the novel’s dramatic action occurs. Preventing the 
direct addresses from seeming either simpleminded or predictable in 
their appeals for unity, Middlemarch occasionally undercuts, as shown in 
the Farebrother and Dorothea lines, the communal vision to which “we” 
all subscribe or concurrently asserts and interrogates organic linkage, as 
shown in the “watching keenly the stealthy convergence of human lots” 
phrase. 
By way of her large-scale deployment of direct questions and 
myriad parentheses, two devices that deliver to Middlemarch unlikely 
comparisons and surprising linkages, Eliot leverages readers to immerse 
themselves in the novel’s intricacies. As one conspicuous example of this 
technique, Eliot begins with direct queries both the Prelude (“Who that 
cares much to know the history of man?”) and the Finale (“Who can quit 
young lives after being long in company with them, and not desire to 
know what befell them in their after-years?”). While in prior novels 
Eliot’s narrators regularly deploy questions in an effort to transport the 
audience into the mind of a character, in Middlemarch direct queries 




question to the audience and then provides a disconcerting response or 
poses a disturbing question and confirms the disturbance in the answer: 
“Will not a tiny speck very close to our vision blot out the glory of the 
world, and leave only a margin by which we see the blot? I know no 
speck so troublesome as self” (42, 307). In addition, Eliot often has her 
narrator declare a fact and then call into question its serviceability with a 
query: “[T]here had been a mixture of criticism and awe in the attitude of 
Celia’s mind towards her elder sister. The younger had always worn a 
yoke; but is there any yoked creature without its private opinions?” (1, 
11).  
This manner of audience solicitation, which might be characterized 
as complex and interrogative, occurs with regularity alongside an 
additional type, one that fuses the authorial hectorings of The Mill on the 
Floss with the compassionate reassurances of Silas Marner and Adam Bede. 
This technique forecloses the audience from harboring any illusions of 
moral ascendancy over a fictional character. Consider, for example, this 
passage that launches a critique of Mr Bulstrode’s “egoistic terrors”: 
“[T]he life-long habit of Mr. Bulstrode’s mind clad his most egoistic 
terrors in doctrinal reference to superhuman ends.” Immediately after the 
narrative renders its strongly implied negative judgment, the subsequent 




But even while we are talking and meditating about the 
earth’s orbit and the solar system, what we feel and adjust 
our movements to is the stable earth and the changing day. 
And now within all the automatic succession of theoretic 
phrases—distinct and inmost as the shiver and the ache of 
oncoming fever when we are discussing abstract pain, was 
the forecast of disgrace in the presence of his neighbours 
and of his own wife. For the pain, as well as the public 
estimate of disgrace, depends on the amount of previous 
profession. (53, 385-386)  
Eliot deploys first-person pronouns less often in other books than 
in Middlemarch, where the usage has the effect of generating an audience 
appeal of a third type. By foregrounding a strong sense of the narrator’s 
wants, troubles, confidences, and doubts, Eliot’s use of the personal “I” 
evinces a struggle to narrow the gap separating novelist from audience 
and to sidestep the troubling and patronizing atmosphere that permeates 
The Mill on the Floss. 
The employment of the narrator’s “I” persona works slightly 
differently in different novels, but in Middlemarch its first-person 
authority has the effect of either certifying the manner in which people 
typically behave or exposing the weaknesses of single characters. At the 
same time, the narrator routinely adopts a tenor so carefully calibrated 
that it can seem wry or lighthearted. Questioning if Casaubon “was fairly 
represented in the minds of those less impassioned personages who have 




narrator warns the reader against the “too hasty judgment . . . in relation 
to Mr. Casaubon” made by Mr Brooke, Celia, and Mrs Cadwallader:  
I am not sure that the greatest man of his age, if ever that 
solitary superlative existed, could escape these 
unfavourable reflections of himself in various small mirrors; 
and even Milton, looking for his portrait in a spoon, must 
submit to have the facial angle of a bumpkin. Moreover, if 
Mr. Casaubon, speaking for himself, has rather a chilling 
rhetoric, it is not therefore certain that there is no good 
work or fine feeling in him. (10, 62) 
At times populating the same scene, these three modes of audience 
solicitation can also meld with indirect appeals. First acknowledging 
Lydgate’s “mind . . . a little spotted with commonness,” the narrator then 
addresses “you” the audience, pleading that the character’s “faults will 
not, I hope, be a reason for the withdrawal of your interest in him”: 
Among our valued friends is there not some one or other 
who is a little too self-confident and disdainful; whose 
distinguished mind is a little spotted with commonness; 
who is a little pinched here and protuberant there with 
native prejudices; or whose better energies are liable to 
lapse down the wrong channel under the influence of 
transient solicitations? All these things might be alleged 
against Lydgate, but then, they are the periphrases of a 
polite preacher, who talks of Adam, and would not like to 
mention anything painful to the pew-renters. (15, 111)  
The narrator of Middlemarch clearly holds a perspective wider than that of 
the characters or the reader. Here, the “I,” who first urges sympathy for 




human traits, deeply suspect but deserving of understanding. The 
succeeding question (“is there not some one or other who is a little too 
self-confident and disdainful. . . ?”) ratifies an uncomfortable certainty. 
Then, turning to the indirect address, the narrator warns against uttering 
“the periphrases of the polite preacher,” a timid figure who fears 
invoking “anything painful to the pew-renters.” Insinuating that it may 
be the audience that occupies the pew, the narrator characterizes “our 
vanities” as possessing small differences without major distinctions: “Our 
vanities differ as our noses do.” Discarding vanities in general in favor of 
vanities in particular, the narrator circles back to describe “Lydgate’s 
conceit” as complex and “of the arrogant sort, never simpering, never 
impertinent, but massive in its claims and benevolently contemptuous.” 
Just when Eliot’s analysis turns tantalizingly intricate, she 
moderates the moment using three narrative turns: she brushes aside 
references to “our valued friends”; she moderates the condemnation of 
both audience and fictional character; and she ridicules the narrator’s 
wordy platitudes and “periphrases.” However, her ridicule fails to 
restrain the narrator from further engaging in overly long or indirect 
language. Consider, for example, the narrator’s announcement that “The 
particular faults from which these delicate generalities are distilled have 




parts in very various dramas.” The narrator then draws an analogy 
between the aforementioned “noses” and “conceits”: “Our vanities differ 
as our noses do: all conceit is not the same conceit, but varies in 
correspondence with the minutiae of mental make in which one of us 
differs from another.” In these passages Eliot directs the irony onto the 
narrator by using specialized scientific language; simultaneously, she 
normalizes that scientific language by making “our noses” the measure of 
“our vanities.” This self-referential normalization suggests both authorial 
composure and a newfound stability in the writer-audience relationship, 
a stability that Eliot seeks and to a great extent achieves in the writing of 
Middlemarch. 
The novel’s unlikely coalition—the ethos of sympathy existing 
alongside uncomfortable and vexing revelations—creates that stability. 
Middlemarch deftly fuses the nonthreatening appeals her audience 
embraced in Adam Bede with the scolding it rejected in The Mill on the 
Floss. Therein, Eliot displays her determination to mix the analytical and 
the remedial while avoiding the offensive. The direct address that 
concludes the Finale’s penultimate paragraph evidences this effort. 
Beginning with the admonition “For there is no creature whose inward 
being is so strong that it is not greatly determined by what lies outside 




insignificant people with our daily words and acts are preparing the lives 
of many Dorotheas, some of which may present a far sadder sacrifice 
than that of the Dorothea whose story we know.” This passage contains 
five sympathetic qualities that mark Eliot’s direct addresses: the unifying 
“we” that invokes shared experience; a barbed reproach of the audience 
found within “our daily words and acts”; an expression of empathy for 
the “far sadder sacrifice”; a valuing of the life dramatized within; and an 
acknowledgment of the society that “lies outside” the character. 
Interestingly, when Eliot’s solicitations turn caustic in Middlemarch, 
the narrator’s “I” often melds with the “we,” as in the “you and me” of 
the novel’s final sentence, a sentence that juxtaposes and thus affiliates 
Dorothea with those “who lived faithfully a hidden life, and rest in 
unvisited tombs”: 
But the effect of her being on those around her was 
incalculably diffusive: for the growing good of the world is 
partly dependent on unhistoric acts; and that things are not 
so ill with you and me as they might have been, is half 
owing to the number who lived faithfully a hidden life, and 
rest in unvisited tombs. 
By deploying and linking her compassionate and analytical voices, 
by striking a delicate balance between the imperatives of sympathy and 
of judicious inquiry, Eliot forms an effective engagement with her 




becomes characteristic of the novel, forms a kind of alliance between 
author and reader. 
!Modifications in formal techniques mark many of George Eliot’s 
novels. Eliot once again in Daniel Deronda alters these techniques, calling 
upon new strategies to enact the range of effects and states of mind she 
endeavors to produce. At those times when her thematic material consists 
of the unfamiliar rather than the conventional, Eliot turns less often to 
direct solicitation. However, when she needs it, she uses the direct 
solicitation in fresh ways, calling upon what by now can be seen as an 
array of techniques.! 
In Middlemarch, the issue of complex linkages constitutes a 
principal method of audience appeal. In Daniel Deronda, Eliot’s final 
novel, the issue takes on new urgency; here, Eliot accentuates both the 
difficulty of discerning these linkages and the necessity of doing so in 
spite of the difficulty. Eliot’s audience addresses focus on juxtaposition, 
dissimilarity, and combination, both genuine and specious, and on the 
importance of distinguishing between the two. The linkages of which 
Eliot makes the reader aware include the nexus between general and 
specific, present and past, conduct and consequences (“some would 
never get their eyes opened if it were not for a violent shock from the 




and poetry (“the sensibility of the artist seizes combinations which 
science explains and justifies”), everyday reality and the poetry of vision, 
sexual roles and morality. What was in Middlemarch an energetic criticism 
of single mindedness Eliot transforms in Daniel Deronda into an unalloyed 
appeal for discovering and enabling broader associations. Eliot’s 
audience solicitations in Middlemarch both resolve and provoke narrative 
strain; this duality often results in tentative, uneasy solutions. 
In Daniel Deronda, however, Eliot’s focus on juxtaposition and 
contradiction generates difficult assertions. For example, in one moment 
Eliot writes ironically that “ignorance gives one a large range of 
probabilities” (13, 174) and mockingly that “the truth is something 
different from the habitual lazy combinations begotten by our wishes” 
(22, 280). At another time Eliot admonishes the audience to “beware of 
arriving at conclusions without comparison” (4, 71) and illustrates 
comparison’s “corrective” capacity:  
In his anxiety about Mirah’s relatives, [Deronda] had lately 
been thinking of vulgar Jews with a sort of personal alarm. 
But a little comparison will often diminish our surprise and 
disgust at the aberrations of Jews and other dissidents 
whose lives do not offer a consistent or lovely pattern of 
their creed; and this evening Deronda, becoming more 
conscious that he was falling into unfairness and ridiculous 
exaggeration, began to use that corrective comparison: he 
paid his thaler too much, without prejudice to his interests 




Schule, which he arrived at by sunset, and entered with a 
good congregation of men. (32, 415)  
At the same time, Eliot’s audience solicitations routinely highlight 
complexity and differentiation, how “lives are enlarged in different 
ways” and how “one man differs from another” (28, 370). Eliot observes 
that difference in addition possesses corrective power, illuminating 
things “which to you are imperceptible” (28, 370). The judicious and 
studied juxtaposition of different things, Eliot advises her audience, 
widens imaginative boundaries. 
In Daniel Deronda, an unusual form of audience solicitation defined 
by a recurrent admonition to “imagine” widens these boundaries even 
further. Eliot exhorts the audience to “imagine” abundant details about a 
narrative parade of characters and objects. At the beginning of chapter 30, 
the narrator asks the reader to 
Imagine a rambling, patchy house, the best part built of 
gray stone, and red-tiled, a round tower jutting at one of the 
corners, the mellow darkness of its conical roof surmounted 
by a weather-cock making an agreeable object either amidst 
the gleams and greenth of summer or the low-hanging 
clouds and snowy branches of winter. 
Later in the chapter, after carefully positioning Mrs Glasher next to 
Grandcourt, Eliot exhorts the reader to 
Imagine the difference in rate of emotion between this 
woman whom the years had worn to a more conscious 




they were dulling into a more and more neutral obstinacy. 
(30: 384, 391) 
Eliot’s narrator also advises the reader to “imagine” Gwendolen’s state of 
mind after she finds herself “a queen disthroned” and to “imagine one 
who had been made to believe in his own divinity finding all homage 
withdrawn” (26, 334). Following Grandcourt’s death, after Gwendolen 
admits to Deronda her secret thoughts of culpability, Eliot asks the 
audience to “imagine the conflict of feeling that kept him silent” (56, 754). 
The theme of what can be imagined rises to prominence also in the 
Princess’ interview with Deronda, where Eliot pushes the narrative from 
compassion to accusation to intrigue as the emphasis travels from the 
Princess to Deronda to the audience.  
Eliot constructs such appeals to the audience more as elaborations 
of familiar modes than as innovations. A real advance takes place when 
the demand to “imagine” merges with the imperative to differentiate. 
Eliot aims some of the solicitations in The Mill on the Floss at female 
audience members and others at males. However, the observations found 
in Daniel Deronda elicit comparisons between females and males but in a 
fashion that solicits the audience’s condemnation of a standard applied 
unfairly. Eliot writes that 
This was nearly poor Gwendolen’s condition. What though 
such a reverse as hers had often happened to other girls? . . . 




down-stepping: imagine one who had been made to believe 
in his own divinity finding all homage withdrawn, and 
himself unable to perform a miracle that would recall the 
homage and restore his own confidence. Something akin to 
this illusion and this helplessness had befallen the poor 
spoiled child. (26, 334) 
Eliot’s puzzling usage of male pronouns in the phrases “his own 
divinity” and “himself unable to perform,” instead of the female versions 
that would be anticipated to follow “queen,” remains unexplained.24 In 
other passages, Eliot treats the double standard explicitly; this excerpt 
from chapter 30 entreats the audience to imagine a calculating 
Grandcourt’s attitude toward Mrs Glasher:  
Grandcourt had of course got weary of her. He was much 
given to the pursuit of women: but a man in his position 
would by this time desire to make a suitable marriage with 
the fair young daughter of a noble house. No one talked of 
Mrs. Glasher now, any more than they talked of the victim 
in a trial for manslaughter ten years before: she was a lost 
vessel after whom nobody would send out an expedition of 
search; but Grandcourt was seen in harbour with his 
colours flying, registered as seaworthy as ever. (30, 386)  
Careful to isolate her audience from potentially off-putting reproach, a 
circumspect Eliot here judiciously invokes “no one,” “they,” and 
“nobody” instead of “we.” In a subsequent sentence, Eliot makes an 
                                                
24 Perhaps Eliot simply makes a mistake and uses male pronouns in reference to “a 
queen,” or perhaps she temporarily and uncharacteristically descends into the common 
practice of writing male pronouns to refer to all persons of any gender. In any case, it 
seems difficult to detect any considered strategic motivation behind Eliot’s odd 




analogous tonal calibration effectuated through indirect address, a 
technique that contains a generic observation about human self-regard:  
Luck had been against him lately; he expected it to turn . . . . 
Lapidoth counted on the fascination of his cleverness—an 
old habit of mind which early experience had sanctioned; 
and it is not only women who are unaware of their 
diminished charm, or imagine that they can feign not to be 
worn out. (66, 844)  
Using that which might be imagined ironic to enumerate shortcomings 
common to both men and women, Eliot inserts a second section:  
Gwendolen, indeed, with all that gnawing trouble in her 
consciousness, had hardly for a moment dropped the sense 
that it was her part to bear herself with dignity, and appear 
what is called happy. . . . She was not without enjoyment in 
this occasion of going to Brackenshaw Castle with her new 
dignities upon her, as men whose affairs are sadly involved 
will enjoy dining out among persons likely to be under a 
pleasant mistake about them. (35, 480)  
Deronda’s interaction with Mordecai provides the basis for Eliot’s 
most sweeping and persistent exhortations to “imagine.” Following the 
encounter on the bridge at the end of Book 5, the most conspicuous of 
these audience appeals occurs. Positioned at the opening of Book 6, the 
plea to “imagine” makes an arresting impression: 
Imagine the conflict in a mind like Deronda’s given not only 
to feel strongly but to question actively, on the evening after 
the interview with Mordecai. To a young man of much 
duller susceptibilities the adventure might have seemed 




it had stirred Deronda so deeply, that with the usual 
reaction of his intellect he began to examine the grounds of 
his emotion, and consider how far he must resist its 
guidance. The consciousness that he was half dominated by 
Mordecai’s energetic certitude, and still more by his fervent 
trust, roused his alarm. (41, 567). 
Deronda’s reflection on this encounter, a musing triggered by 
Deronda’s “alarm” at having been “stirred” “so deeply” by Mordecai, 
occupies the whole of chapter 16. Deronda proceeds to imagine the dark 
words that Sir Hugo Mallinger might use to describe Mordecai: “a 
consumptive Jew, possessed by a fanaticism which obstacles and 
hastening death intensified.” Sir Hugo’s definition betrays antipathies 
some of Eliot’s audience might be inclined to embrace. This passage 
exemplifies the ways in which Eliot coerces her audience to experience 
the working of Deronda’s mind. 
Eliot structures the chapter to generate wide swings between two 
opposing poles: fanciful passion and knowing reaction. She places 
Mordecai, the “enthusiast” with “illusory notions,” the contrapositive of 
the type of person typifying “a man of the world,” at one pole. At the 
other, she sets Deronda, that “man of the world” who “knows what to 
think beforehand” and who thinks Mordecai a figure deserving of 
mockery. Eliot characterizes Deronda as a man “whose clothing and 
action” indicate seriousness of purpose, who “dressed for dinner” and 




mockery: the stigma of “vulgarity” attaches not to the “poor Jewish 
workman” but to the “man of the world.” Eliot utilizes this swapping 
tactic regularly in Daniel Deronda, initially to coddle and inflate 
predictable worldly prejudices and subsequently to invert the object of 
caricature or mockery. 
Additional instances of oscillation between fanciful, ardent belief 
and knowing calculation occur in this chapter. Eliot’s solicitation to 
imagine Deronda’s nagging problem, the potential that “Mordecai’s ideas 
made a real conquest over Deronda’s conviction,” serves finally as a 
warning against “mere dullness of imagination”:  
As that possibility presented itself in his meditations, he 
was aware that it would be called dreamy, and began to 
defend it. If the influence he imagined himself submitting to 
had been that of some honoured professor, some authority 
in a seat of learning, some philosopher who had been 
accepted as a voice of the age, would a thorough 
receptiveness towards direction have been ridiculed? . . . 
Poverty and poor clothes are no sign of inspiration, said 
Deronda to his inward objector, but they have gone with it 
in some remarkable cases. And to regard discipleship as out 
of the question because of them, would be mere dullness of 
imagination. (41, 571) 
Insinuating sympathetic linkages and ratifying certain values that Eliot 
would have her audience pursue, this passage at the same time walls off 
Daniel from the novel’s audience. “Our consciences are not all of the 




they are the voice of sensibilities as various as our memories 
(which also have their kinship and likeness). And 
Deronda’s conscience included sensibilities beyond the 
common, enlarged by his early habit of thinking himself 
imaginatively into the experience of others. (41, 570) 
While presenting Deronda’s self-examination to the reader, Eliot invokes 
“our human thinking” either in “sum total” or in “separate minds”; she 
then associates the authority and potency of imagination with “the 
passionate patience of genius” required to explore “the world”: 
We must be patient with the inevitable makeshift of our 
human thinking, whether in its sum total or in the separate 
minds that have made the sum. Columbus had some 
impressions about himself which we call superstitions, and 
used some arguments which we disapprove; but he had 
also some true physical conceptions, and he had the 
passionate patience of genius to make them tell on 
mankind. The world has made up its mind rather 
contemptuously about those who were deaf to Columbus. 
(41, 572-573)  
As striking an impression as her rationalization for imagination, 
“the passionate patience of genius,” makes, it functions as only one 
limited element of a wider assertion concerning the linkage between 
communal value and creative invention. Eliot depicts Daniel facing the 
awareness that bravery does not occur on a grand stage but within the 
wins and losses of quotidian existence. Regularly in Daniel Deronda, 




descriptions of a valiant interior life. Concerning this unlikely 
juxtaposition, Eliot writes of 
the irony of earthly mixtures, that the heroes have not 
always had carpets and tea-cups of their own; and, seen 
through the open window by the mackerel-vendor, may 
have been invited with some hopefulness to pay three 
hundred per cent in the form of fourpence. (43, 606) 
Indeed, the irony mandates that even Daniel must endure being “visited 
with doubt whether” he puts “the lower effect for the higher.” 
Owing to her own need to uplift, George Eliot often excludes in 
Daniel Deronda the “irony of earthly mixtures” from the exhortation to 
“imagine.” For example, Eliot asks the reader to “Imagine the difference 
in Deronda’s state of mind” before and after he learns the details of his 
lineage:  
He had set out for Genoa in total uncertainty how far the 
actual bent of his wishes and affections would be 
encouraged—how far the claims revealed to him might 
draw him into new paths, far away from the tracks his 
thoughts had lately been pursuing with a consent of desire 
which uncertainty made dangerous. He came back with 
something like a discovered charter warranting the 
inherited right that his ambition had begun to yearn for. (63, 
812-813) 
Eliot undermines this passage’s seriousness by describing in broad, 
parodic language the 
classical, romantic, world-historic position of his, bringing 




wore—but so, one must suppose, did the most ancient 
heroes, whether Semitic or Japhetic—the summer costume 
of his contemporaries. 
Despite her reference here and elsewhere to the “Semitic,” Eliot 
does not intend to write a Jewish novel; she clearly wants Daniel Deronda 
to reflect a period of time and its connection to the individual and to 
world history. The Jewish people and the “Jewish question” function only 
as vehicles for the conveyance of a central ideological theme.25 The 
earliest of the solicitations to “imagine” invoking this Jewish issue 
provides an emphatic illustration of Eliot’s urge to exclude from Daniel 
Deronda components fundamental to her work. Unsurprisingly, Eliot 
                                                
25 See Michael Ragussis, Figures of Conversion: “The Jewish Question” and English National 
Identity (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1995) for a detailed study of the ways in 
which the so-called “Jewish question” provoked debate throughout the nineteenth 
century. Ragussis’s particular interest goes to those novelists—Eliot, Edgeworth, Scott, 
and Disraeli—who attempted to counteract and revise the culturally hegemonic plan of 
conversion. English national identity was a problem, rather than a given, for these 
novelists, and by disengaging the representation of Jewish religion, life, and culture 
from conversionist propaganda, they worked toward a more nuanced sense of both 
Jewishness and Englishness. Daniel Deronda falls clearly within the discursive 
parameters that Ragussis stakes out; however, his study does not offer a convincing 
answer to the question of why Eliot should have turned toward Judaism in her quest for 
a regenerated English future. Other recent studies address Judaism and nationalism in 
Daniel Deronda. Reina Lewis, for example, examines “the development of concepts 
(notably of Englishness, the familiar and the alien) that pre-empt and structure” the 
novel. Lewis pays special attention to the critical responses of Victorian Anglo-Jewish 
writers to Eliot’s work, “in order to focus . . . the interpenetrative discourses of 
Englishness and Jewishness that suffuse the novel and its reception” (Gendering 
Orientalism: Race, Femininity, and Representation [London: Routledge, 1996, p. 193]. By 
comparison, Susan Meyer considers how Eliot’s novel evinces “the suppression of 
feminist impulses” while displaying an “increase in imperialist sentiment and an 
endorsement, by way of proto-Zionism, of racial separatism” (Imperialism at Home: Race 




solicits on behalf of Mirah, whom Eliot likens to “a child,” arguably the 
novel’s character most in need of support. Eliot’s “child” analogy 
displays Feuerbach’s humanitarianism stalled, with Mirah, in spite of her 
sympathetic appeal, estranged more than humanized. Moreover, the 
passage, in addition to twice invoking the reader to “imagine” on Mirah’s 
behalf, seems to compare that character to the “worn instrument” she 
plays: 
She immediately rose and went to the piano — a somewhat 
worn instrument that seemed to get the better of its 
infirmities under the firm touch of her small fingers as she 
preluded. . . . Imagine her — it is always good to imagine a 
human creature in whom bodily loveliness seems as 
properly one with the entire being as the bodily loveliness 
of those wondrous transparent orbs of life that we find in 
the sea — imagine her with her dark hair brushed from her 
temples, but yet showing certain tiny rings there which had 
cunningly found their own way back, the mass of it hanging 
behind just to the nape of the little neck in curly fibres, such 
as renew themselves at their own will after being bathed 
into straightness like that of water-grasses. (32, 421-422) 
Standing apart because of its vaguely whimsical quality, a 
different reader solicitation to “imagine” takes place as Hans Meyrick 
coyly dangles news from Italy before Mrs Meyrick and Mirah. As his 
mother eagerly inquires, “What on earth is the wonderful news?,” Hans 
responds playfully:  
“Nothing about Italy, but something from Italy,” said Hans, 




mother interpreting. Imagine how some of us feel and 
behave when an event, not disagreeable, seems to be 
confirming and carrying out our private constructions. We 
say, “What do you think?” in a pregnant tone to some 
innocent person who has not embarked his wisdom in the 
same boat with ours, and finds our information flat. (61, 
794) 
Eliot subsequently relates to the reader that Hans, “whose talk 
naturally fluttered toward mischief,” engages in a “form of experiment 
on live animals which consisted in irritating his friends playfully” (797). 
Here George Eliot engages “playfully” in a self-referential critique, 
knowing that some readers will find “irritating” the particular fictive 
experiment in which she participates and which she insists they endure. 
The following solicitation more adequately epitomizes Eliot’s pleas 
to “imagine”; redounding to Mordecai’s benefit, this particular plea asks 
“all of us” to 
Imagine—we all of us can—the pathetic stamp of 
consumption with its brilliancy of glance to which the 
sharply-defined structure of features, reminding one of a 
forsaken temple, give already a far-off look as of one getting 
unwillingly out of reach; and imagine it on a Jewish face 
naturally accentuated for the expression of an eager mind—
the face of a man little above thirty, but with that age upon 
it which belongs to time lengthened by suffering. . . . (40, 
552) 
In a previous passage, Eliot characterizes Deronda and Mordecai 
as “two men, with as intense a consciousness as if they had been two 




instinctive feeling that they wished to see each other fully.” Contradicting 
this intimate description, Deronda earlier holds Mordecai at arm’s length. 
Eliot writes: “And yet it might be that he had neared and parted as one 
can imagine two ships doing, each freighted with an exile who would 
have recognised the other if the two could have looked out face to face” 
(40, 549). Eliot’s novel positions “face to face” characters who desire social 
union even as they suffer social exile. Ironically, in this, her only partially 
successful novelistic experiment, George Eliot confronts her own readers 
“face to face” by issuing to them authorial provocations to “imagine” 
new boundaries. 
Daniel Deronda undeniably fails to live up to the expectations of a 
large segment of Eliot’s contemporary audience. Many find distasteful 
the novel’s highly unusual contemporary concern with the standing of 
Jews in British and European society. Unflatteringly comparing Daniel 
Deronda to Eliot’s previous novels, A.V. Dicey voices, in an 1876 Nation 
review, attitudes shared by many: 
The sense of dissatisfaction with the result of Daniel Deronda 
has its source in something deeper than any of the 
peculiarities of the story. The reader feels that there is 
something disappointing in the development of George 
Eliot’s own genius. The power, the humor, the deep moral 
insight which were revealed to the public in Adam Bede and 
Scenes of Clerical Life are all to be found in Deronda. The 
genius is still there, but the proportions of the qualities that 




Reflection prevails over description, and the moral purpose 
always discernible in George Eliot’s works threatens to 
throw into the shade the author’s creative power. (Nation, 
XXIII [1876]: 245–246) 
However, if Eliot stumbles in her attempt to win her readers’ 
unanimous approval, she resolutely continues to advance her 
sympathetic vision. R.E. Francillon’s stirring invocation of the “courage” 
of Eliot’s artistic vision provides a glimpse of the sympathetic aura one 
critic detects surrounding the novel, a work he regards as ultimately 
concerned with the “truer and deeper”:  
Daniel Deronda alone . . . is proof enough that its author has 
the courage to enter upon the surest road to the highest 
kind of popularity—that which apparently leads above it. 
There is not a sentence, scarcely a character, in Daniel 
Deronda that reads or looks as if she were thinking of her 
critics before her readers at large, or of her readers at large 
before the best she could give them. She has often marred a 
stronger and more telling effect for the sake of a truer and 
deeper—and this belongs to a kind of courage which most 
most artists will be inclined to envy her. (Gentleman’s 
Magazine XVII [October 1876]: 411–427) 
Daniel Deronda, writes Edward Dowden in 1877, delivers Eliot’s 
sympathetic agenda most forcefully in the “meeting of the Jewish 
workman and Deronda in the splendor of sunset, and the gloom of the 
little second-hand bookshop, while the soul of one transfuses itself into 
the soul of the other.” Another critic praises that Eliot “should have 




and should have brought them forward so prominently and lavished 
upon them the wealth of her genius.” In an 1876 review, James Picciotto 
maintains that the thematic concerns of Daniel Deronda accomplish 
nothing less than a 
vindication of a long maligned race against ignorant 
misrepresentation or wilful aspersion, the defence of Jews 
and Judaism against fanaticism and prejudice. George Eliot 
has laid open before a larger audience than had ever before 
been summoned for a similar purpose, the aims and scope 
and innermost thoughts of Judaism, and she has 
accomplished more for the cause of toleration and 
enlightenment then could have been achieved by any 
amount of legislation. 
To have broached these questions before the popular 
mind is already to have obtained a great gain, and George 
Eliot has thus earned the gratitude, not only of her 
countrymen of the Jewish race, but of all thinkers and 
friends of progress. (Gentleman’s Magazine XVII [November 
1876]: 593-603) 
As this chapter has shown, George Eliot’s usage of reader address 
prepares the ground for implanting in the audience Eliot’s charitable 
aesthetics, her commitment to social interdependence, and her desire to 
move “towards linking the higher classes with the lower, towards 
obliterating the vulgarity of exclusiveness.” Traditionally thought to 
produce a breaking of aesthetic illusion, audience appeals in Eliot’s 
novels in fact serve the opposite function: they deepen the reader’s 




constantly to increase the reader’s empathy for her characters, to 
elucidate the complexity of all human relationships, Eliot’s strategic 
techniques succeed in promoting the aesthetic of sympathy and in 







In this world there are so many of these common, coarse 
people, who have no picturesque or sentimental 
wretchedness! And it is so needful we should remember 
their existence, else we may happen to leave them quite out 
of our religion and philosophy, and frame lofty theories 
which only fit a world of extremes. 
The narrator’s admonition in Adam Bede calls attention to the 
particular quality Eliot holds as the highest purpose of art—the 
“extension of our sympathies.” For Eliot, novels or other works of art that 
misrepresent their subjects direct the audience’s “fellow feeling” toward 
an unjust end. As she writes in “The Natural History of German Life,” 
“our social novels profess to represent the people as they are, and the 
unreality of their representations is a grave evil” (Essays 270). Eliot sees 
the idealized representation of the “common, coarse people” as 
particularly specious because it short circuits understanding and prevents 
true sympathy from reaching those “more heavily-laden fellow-men” 
who endure particularly hard lives. As if to further emphasize this point, 





impose on us any aesthetic rules which shall banish from 
the region of Art those old women scraping carrots with 
their work-worn hands, those heavy clowns taking holiday 
in a dingy pot-house, those rounded backs and stupid 
weather-beaten faces that have bent over the spade and 
done the rough work of the world—those homes with their 
tin pans, their brown pitchers, their rough curs, and their 
clusters of onions. 
Eliot’s sympathetic social vision interlaces with her concern for 
community; this combination results from her belief that the individual 
should be bound to others. Her embracing of Feuerbach’s I-Thou 
formulation, wherein man serves as God to man, casts a revealing light 
on Eliot’s view of the relationship between the self and society. Her 
fiction presents characters engaged in a struggle to find the right social 
environment for self-fulfillment—the capacity to offer and accept 
sympathy and to treat others respectfully and sensitively—but she sees 
this struggle as closely tied to the kinds of communities in which these 
characters anchor themselves. Therefore, Eliot’s concept of a person’s 
relationship to a proximate community, as distinct from a total society or 
the larger human race, can be seen as her contribution to that wide river 





In writing her novels, George Eliot imports to the aesthetic of 
sympathy both the agreement essential to a community of feeling and the 
skepticism and productive discord equally vital to any transformational 
project. In her pursuit, George Eliot encounters the formidable problem of 
changing her audience but not estranging it. Her fiction’s attempt to alter 
the reader’s awareness often contains a condemnation of orthodox action 
and thought. This condemnation, of course, imperils the particular 
sensation of community the writer sets out to generate. At the same time, 
however, turning away from such condemnation holds the potential to 
sabotage Eliot’s goal by leaving the audience passive and complacent 
instead of energized and motivated to take regenerative action. 
George Eliot responds in the formal techniques of her work to 
rapid changes in Victorian society and to what she sees as erosions of 
coherent social faiths and orders. Exploring the past, she for the most part 
comprehends the relationship between communal and traditional values. 
However, Eliot inevitably cannot resist transplanting her own 
imperatives into her devotional notion of what an alliance of sympathetic 
human beings might accomplish. Feuerbach regards religion as the 
anthropomorphic expression of man’s loftiest aims: “The yearning of man 
after something above himself is nothing else than the longing after the 




with social belief, Eliot clings to a carefully calibrated standard of this 
perfection, one that rejects Heaven but adopts a secularized standard of 
human community. A persuasive argument can be made that Eliot, 
replaying Feuerbach’s concept of “man is God to man,” often proposes 
solutions inadequate to the issues they seek to address, and that many of 
the remedies she seems to champion fail to make a dent in real-world 
Victorian problems. Nevertheless, multiple forms and devices of George 
Eliot’s writing—modes of reader address, evolutions of character, arrays 
of images, structures of narrative—vividly and stubbornly reflect these 
complex issues. 
As this dissertation has attempted to show, Eliot’s literary 
techniques evince her unflagging optimism in the power of formal 
strategies and a Victorian aesthetic of sympathy to alter and enlarge the 
sensibilities of her readers and their capacities for sympathetic response. 
Through these readers, Eliot seeks to effect so comprehensive a 
transformation of sensibility that it will finally change society. Ultimately, 
on a different level, Eliot successfully explores the contradictory ground 
that separates social theory from the autonomous work of art, an 
exploration carried out through the transference of her sympathetic 
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